OPEN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

Migration then and now and its impact in Europe

Case studies: Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, North Macedonia & United Kingdom

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Contents

Introduction

Within the framework of the “Open European Societies” project, a collection of short research papers has been created about migration experiences in the participating countries; Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, North Macedonia and the United Kingdom. By researching the history of migration in the participating countries, the causes and the impact of migration in their countries’ communities in the 20th century on sociopolitical, economic and cultural level. The project aims to raise awareness on the most important migration movements of the participating countries in the 20th century. And remind the reader and all European citizens that migration is not a current phenomenon having only negative effects but also positive impact on the economy, demographic development and cultural enrichment of the European countries.

“Open European Societies” is a project that brings together 8 countries and 12 partners, all committed to supporting migrant and refugee integration, community development, tackling xenophobia, discrimination and hate speech. The aim of “Open European Societies” is to eradicate the stigmatisation of migrants and refugees, by helping the communities of the participating countries to overcome stereotypes and by developing counter-narratives through video campaigns and video recorded stories of third-country nationals that give more accurate insights into their situations and experiences.

The partner organizations are the following:

Jugend- & Kulturprojekt e.V. – Dresden, Germany – Coordinator

Municipality of Dresden – Germany

Memorare Pacem e.V. – Dresden, Germany

Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece

AddArt NGO – Thessaloniki, Greece

Aarhus University, Denmark

European Reminiscence Network – London, United Kingdom

University of Greenwich, United Kingdom

Pro Progressione Kulturalis – Budapest, Hungary

Institut pro Regionalni Rozvoj – Prague, Czech Republic

La Transplanisphere – Paris, France

Association Center for Intercultural Dialogue – Kumanovo, North Macedonia



The study on the history of migration in the participating countries gives evidence to the diversity and co-existence of different nations and cultures in the countries of Europe after WWII. In addition, it focuses on the impact of migration on the partners' countries/cities on socioeconomic, demographic and cultural level.

This study aims at understanding migration movements as a constant phenomenon that has shaped our societies, sharing experiences of migration from the participating countries in order to achieve a better understanding of the past and thus of the current situation. Information and data have been collected from relevant and reliable sources, such as archives, surveys, statistics, articles and reports.

The study includes:

- a description of a time span with strong migratory movements in the participating countries explaining the reason why these migratory movements were selected,
- a description of the causes of migration through the push and pull factors approach; and
- a description of the impact of the migration movements on the partners' countries from a social, economic, demographic and political perspective.

Supplementary, in terms of terminology, taking into consideration:

- the fact that at the international level, no universally accepted definitions for the terms of 'migrant' and 'immigrant' exist;
- the fact that while dictionary definitions distinguish 'immigrants' (people who are or intend to be settled in their new country) from 'migrants' (who are temporarily resident), 'immigrant' and 'migrant' (as well as 'foreigner') are often used interchangeably in public debate and even among research specialists;
- the fact that the definition of who is an 'emigrant' can vary from one country to another;
- the need to create a reader-friendly document and avoid legal complexities that could confuse the average reader,

this study is making use of the following main terms based on the 'Glossary on migration' of UN Migration Agency – IOM (International Organization for Migration), the leading intergovernmental organization in the field of migration (IOM, 2019):

Migrant

An umbrella term covering all forms of movements, and reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally-defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students.

Note: The present definition was developed by IOM for its own purposes and it is not meant to imply or create any new legal category.

Migration

The movement of persons away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a State.

Migrant flow (international)

The number of international migrants arriving in a country (immigrants) or the number of international migrants departing from a country (emigrants) over the course of a specific period.

Refugee

A person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol].

Asylum seeker

An asylum-seeker is an individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum-seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker.

Family reunification

The right of non-nationals to enter into and reside in a country where their family members reside lawfully or of which they have the nationality in order to preserve the family unit.

Emigration

From the perspective of the country of departure, the act of moving from one's country of nationality or usual residence to another country, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence.

Brief clarifications are provided within the research papers in cases where the national legislation expounds alternatively some of the above-mentioned terms or additional terms are highlighted.

Czech Republic

Introduction

In this paper, the migration trends in the Czech Republic between 1989 and approximately 2000 are analysed. This time period is of special significance for Czechia because of the political and geographical changes that happened mainly in 1989 when the Soviet Union fell and in 1993 when the Czech Republic became a unitary state after the division of the former Czechoslovakia. The main purpose of this research is to highlight the migratory movements that characterised the country during the 20th century, in order to understand present trends and flows also from a historic perspective.

It is intended to explain the historical, political and economic importance of the chosen era, while indicating the basic migration trends during it. Additionally, we will describe the pull and push factors of the migrants' behaviour and overall impacts of the migratory movements on the country. Finally, we will analyse the main migration groups in reliance to their nationality, their main motivation of arrival and occupation in the new country, as well as other migratory trends.

This paper draws mainly upon the work done by Dušan Drbohlav, professor at Charles University in Prague, one of the main experts on the subject of immigration. The specific data and statistics are sourced from official statistical websites such as the migrationdataportal.org or Eurostat.

Migration background

People with a migration background who have migrated into their present country of residence, might previously have held a different nationality from the present one or they have at least one parent (mother or father) who entered their present country as a migrant; people belonging to this last category are also called “second generation migrants”.

Czech Republic today

The International Migrant Stock Total (IMST) is the number of people born in a country other than the one in which they live, and it includes refugees. At the end of 2017, Czech Republic’s IMST counted 433.300 foreigners (see Figure 1). UNHCR recognized that, among them, 5957 people were included in the categories of refugees (3644 people), asylum seekers (811) and stateless persons (1502) (UNHCR, 2017). Last data concerning the migrant stock by origin dates back to 2013, when the top 5 countries of migrants’ origin included Ukraine, Slovakia, Vietnam, Russian Federation and Poland. The majority of them were male aged between 30 and 39 years old (UNICEF, 2013).



Figure 1: Numberof foreigners in the Czech Republic 1993 - 2017.
Source: Czech Statistical Office

Migration waves in Czechia in 1989-1999

This paper is focused on the period between the fall of the USSR in 1989 and the end of the 1990s. This period was for the Czech Republic the period of significant political as well as geographical changes. There were two main events which greatly influenced the Czech Republic´s future immigration situation and those were:

1) The fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 17.11.1989, and

2) The division of former Czechoslovakia in 01.01.1993.



Figure 2: Linguistic map of Czechoslovakia from 1930.
Source: www.reddit.com

The fall of the Soviet Union meant a complete change from the previous totalitarian regime to democracy. After forty years of the communist regime in its full practice (restriction of human rights, free movement, free religion, etc.), the political environment for citizens changed drastically. The Czech Republic experienced a slightly different course in migration trends than the rest of the former satellite republics. It did not experience huge migration flows to Western Europe, but it rather became a transition country or even a target country for some migrants (Arltová et al., 2010). This is mainly because of its geographical position as a border country between the so-called west and east Europe and its appealing economical potential. Regarding the emigration trends after the Velvet revolution, the main target countries in 1990 for Czechs were Germany (1,261), Switzerland (742), Australia (430), Canada (389) and Austria (334) (Drbohlav, 1994).

The division of Czechoslovakia also caused very substantial political changes. Since 1918, the Czech and Slovak Republics formed one state called Czechoslovakia. The fall of the Soviet Union and internal problems of the state, however, led to its gradual division which was formally ended on the 1st of January 1993. Since then, the Czech Republic is a sovereign state, but the special relations with Slovakia remain. Until 1999 Slovak citizens were officially the

largest group of migrants coming into the Czech Republic. The real numbers can be mainly presented as the continuation of the country's ties due to long mutual history. The Slovak migrants were later outnumbered by the Ukrainians. The rest of the migrants were back then mainly citizens of Vietnam, Russia, Poland and Germany (Drbohlav, Dušan, et al., 2009).

Regarding the emigration trends of Czech citizens to foreign countries, the situation did not change much in comparison to the situation after 1989. The Czech Republic is relatively economically stable country and therefore Czech citizens do not have a heavy motivation to emigrate.

Push and pull factors

As already mentioned, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Czech Republic represented an exception in comparison to other countries of the Eastern Bloc: it was part of the buffer zone between Western and Eastern Europe and so, it turned out to be a transit country for people migrating because of the increase of freedom of movement, both inside and outside its borders.

The country quickly became an attractive area especially for labour migration: "The increase in foreigners who came to the Czech Republic to work is linked mainly to the shortage of qualified and unqualified manual workers on the labour market. In other sectors of the economy, the level of wages is higher and so some of these professions are not attractive for the domestic population" (Arltová and Langhamrová, 2010, p. 64). Figure 3 shows the development in the number of resident foreigners, who reached the amount of more than 200.000 between 1994 and 1999. In these years, permanent residents increased mostly because of the regulations reduced the strictness of the legislation and also because of the establishment of big ethnic groups within the country.



Figure 3: International Migration in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and the Outlook for East Central Europe, DUŠAN DRBOHLAV, Czech Sociological Review, II, (1/1994).

The five largest foreign groups remained the same since 1996 and they include respectively people from Ukraine, Slovakia, Vietnam, Russia and Poland. “As for the smaller immigrant groups, it is possible to observe a large increase of citizens coming from some post-Soviet republics (particularly Moldova, Kazakhstan), Mongolia and from some European countries (especially from Germany and Great Britain)” (Drbohlav et al., 2009, p. 22).

Concerning emigration, the Czech Republic does not show significant numbers since 1989, because of its relative political stability, democracy and growing living standards. However, a phenomenon regarding labour emigrants can be noted: the ‘pendlers’ were those people migrating for seasonal jobs mostly toward Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom during the 1990s.

Particular attention must be given to refugees and asylum seekers, who perceived the country as a temporary stay: 90% of those applying for the refugee status in Czechoslovakia didn’t intend to stay and 50% of them suddenly ‘vanished’ during the 1990s, supposedly to reach a Western country. Their countries of origin were mostly Romania, Bulgaria and the former Soviet Union and men constituted the highest percentage (Drbohlav, 2004).

The Impacts of the migratory movements

The impacts of migration on the Czech Republic are not easy to be measured, especially regarding the 1989-1999 decade. Concerning the economic impact, “very limited data is available, and little is known” (Drbohlav et al., 2009, p. 63). Thus, the insufficient amount of data about foreigners’ salaries, taxes, transfers etc. does not allow the full understanding of trends.

On the contrary, social and demographic impacts can be partially measured. One of the most interesting available data when it comes to measuring social inclusion of migrants into local communities is the share of mixed marriages. They have been increasing since 1995 and in most of the cases a Czech woman married a foreign man; because of the shared history as a united country, the highest number of marriages included a person of Slovak nationality. Czech men usually got married with ‘eastern’ women (from Slovakia, Ukraine, Vietnam or Russia), while Czech women were mostly engaged to ‘western’ men (from the UK, USA or Austria). The Czech demography has been influenced by migrations in terms of total numbers. Figure 4 shows that during the second half of the 1990s a strong natural decrease of the population took place, which was compensated by the immigration rates. Immigrants have different age and gender structures in the country, but their impact on the total population is not significant.

The criminality rate has remained stable since 1993: 6% of all convicted people in the Czech Republic are migrants, even though the number of foreign people entering the country has grown over time. Back in that time, the tolerance of Czech citizens related to people of different colour was between 40% and 60% and it has been increasing since then.

Finally, the Vietnamese community represents a peculiar case, as in the early 1990s their arrivals started to exponentially grow and they mostly dedicated themselves to business activities rather than studying, as it was happening in the 1980s. “Rising consumption combined with limited international trade and insufficient domestic production led to gaps in the clothing market that could be filled by new small businesses. Sales of textiles and assorted products became

the core economic activity for Vietnamese after 1989, followed by other business activity, such as translating, publishing, groceries, etc." (Souralová, 2014, p. 101).

Vietnamese people from other European territories started to enter the Czech Republic, as many of them were in the country before, as students and trainees. Many families were reunited in such way and the Vietnamese migration turned itself from a state-managed one (1980s) into a work-related migration.



Figure 4: Changes of population figures in the Czech Republic 1990-2006: migration and natural changes

Conclusion

In this paper the migratory trends in the Czech Republic have been analysed during the period between 1989 and 2000. Our conclusions are mainly based on the official statistical trends.

The migratory trends to and from the Czech Republic were driven mainly by the changing economic and political situation in the region. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the democratic division of former Czechoslovakia, Czechia became a unitary, sovereign, democratic state. Naturally, after the change of the regime to a democracy with respect to citizens' rights, such as the right of free movement, the migratory waves appeared. The Czech Republic became, however, mostly a transition country or even a target country for immigrants from the Balkan and eastern European countries.

During the first years after the division, the largest group of migrants was the Slovak citizens. This can be, however, mainly explained as the result of the mutual historical and family ties of the two countries. Gradually, the situation stabilised and the largest groups of migrants were mainly from Ukraine, Vietnam, Russia and Poland. In respect to emigration of Czech citizens, the main target countries are Germany, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and Austria.

Due to its quite stable economic situation and geographical position, the country became relatively attractive. The statistics of the Czech Republic show continuous growth of democracy, political stability and growth of living standards. The important trend which is worth noticing is the trend of "pendlers", who are temporary migrants, looking for seasonal work.

The data regarding the impact of the migration on the Czech Republic were unfortunately quite limited. The main impacts we noticed were statistics of mixed marriages and toleration of Czech citizens regarding people of different color. Both have been increasing since 1995. The Vietnamese minority holds a particular place in the Czech Republic, and it is still growing. Its impact is mainly visible in the capital city of Prague, where the Vietnamese community is dedicated to business activities, mainly small grocery stores.

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Denmark

Introduction

As the world has become an increasingly small place, with the ability of people to be transported long distances in a short amount of time, with the internet facilitating communication instantaneously allowing for simultaneous reporting of situations physically distant from oneself, and with the examples for political organization, cultural formulation, and even linguistic competency becoming more and more standardised, it seems inevitable that we come in contact with people with diverse opinions, as well as cultural, social, and national backgrounds. With such information also comes the idea of travel, and with intercultural contact, there is inevitably a desire not only to learn and visit, but also to reside in another country.

Consequently, migration has become more commonplace. However, not always migration is a matter of personal choice, and larger global factors, economic, political, and environmental, also force the decisions about migration upon individuals, nations and cultures. This paper recounts the history of migration into Denmark. This is combined with the history of migration in other European countries to show that, while there are important local factors, the overall understanding of migration has common root causes and is not limited to any location. This paper will trace the history of migration to Denmark, focusing on the decade from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, as a decade which has had a large impact on the understanding and rhetoric around migration for our contemporary times.

Immigrants and Descendants

There is a variety of legal and common parlance definitions that describe people who relocate to Denmark. Some of these definitions are international, with specific connotations for legal status. Other definitions are national, reflecting the specific immigration patterns into Denmark, and recognising the historical and political distinctions of individuals from specific countries.

Statistics on immigration are compiled by the Danish Statistical Agency, which produces a report specifically on immigration and refugees. According to this governmental agency, indvandrere (immigrants) are defined as those people who are born outside of Denmark, and do not have a parent with Danish citizenship. Thus, a child of two parents with Danish citizenship born for instance in the US, would be Danish (and not an immigrant). There is no right of citizenship by birth, so it is not enough to be born in Denmark in order to be a citizen. This designation applies regardless of the citizenship of the individual, including from neighboring countries (the Nordic countries or those members of the EU), though does not apply to people from Greenland or the Faroe Islands (these are designated as part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and thus are treated as internal migrants).

Historically (prior to 1998), individuals who were descendants of immigrants were classified in generations of immigration. Those individuals who were born in Denmark to immigrant parents were classified as 2nd generation immigrants. Those who were born in Denmark to parents of 2nd generation immigrants were classified as 3rd generation immigrants, and so on. This continued as long as individual immigrants remained citizens of their homeland (or another country than Denmark). It was not possible, in the 20th century, to obtain Danish citizenship without giving up one's prior citizenship (the law changed in this regard in 2015).

The classification based on generational immigration was changed in the statistical report of 1998. At this point it was recognized that identifying 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants was statistically challenging and did not reflect the realities of immigration. When a couple made up of a 2nd generation immigrant and a direct immigrant from abroad would marry and have children, the designation of those children became complicated (they are 2nd generation with reference to one parent, and third generation with reference to the other). Thus, in 1998, Danmarks Statistik designated such individuals with the label efterkommere (descendants).

Now these individuals born in Denmark, where their parent hold Danish citizenship, are designated as efterkommere or descendants. One of the consequences for this designation is that communities in which members tend to intermarry can retain the designation Efterkommer to subsequent generations, regardless of their integration into Danish culture and society in other ways (education, language, culture). The recent law on dual citizenship may change this statistically, if more immigrants and descendants obtain Danish citizenship but the law is too new to see reliable statistics on the consequence of this change.

Furthermore, in 1998, there remained a third category, officially designated Øvrige (capitalised), which translates as other. This category is for those individuals who were born of one parent who is a Danish citizen and was born in Denmark, regardless of the birthplace of the individual. Thus, children of two Danish parents (citizens born in the country) and children of mixed parentage (Danish and Immigrant/Efterkommere) are placed in this third category. This represents the vast majority of the populace of Denmark. In 1998, there were 276.781 immigrants, 70.252 descendants, and 4.947.827 Øvrige (Other). One can see, as a consequence, that this was a methodological means for identifying the majority of citizens based on their

not being immigrants or descendants. According to the Rockwall report, other neighboring countries name the final category using the national appellation, and thus they identify this category as 'Danes.'

In addition to the above designation, Danmarks Statistik also recognises a distinction based upon which country one immigrates from. In 1998, this designation is based on the UN's 1994 division of nations into developed and less developed nations. Those countries designated 'developed' included all European countries (with the exclusion of Turkey and Cyprus), the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and some parts of the former Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Less developed countries are designated in the negative, comprising all countries that were not designated above.

Currently, there is an official designation between Western and Non-Western immigrants, rather than the prior designation based on development. This is defined by inclusion, on the Western side, and default for the other category. One is a Western immigrant if one arrives in Denmark from one of the EU28 countries, and a selection of other European countries (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Andorra, Lichtenstein, San Marino, and the Vatican State), as well as the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Immigrants from all other countries not specifically listed are designated as non-Western.

As one can see, this changes the dynamics of integration – as countries that were previously included (from Eastern Europe and former Soviet Republics) as well as Japan are now classified as non-Western. More direct comparisons with prior reports can be made using the national breakdowns of immigrants and descendants, though as Whyte (2003) indicates, assignations based on nationality are not always accurate (based on the various trajectories of immigration) and are difficult to remedy in the Danish system.

Denmark and the History of Migration

Denmark has historically been a homogenous country and was largely a country with only one main ethnic population until the 1960s. While larger European conflicts caused changes in the geographic boundaries of the country in the 1800s and early 1900s (through both World Wars), there was a common sense of what it meant to belong to a Danish society which was concomitant with its ethnic roots.

The immediate aftermath of World War II did include a period in which there was a relatively large number of Germans that remained in Denmark awaiting repatriation. This situation, took nearly four years before it was resolved with the last remaining German refugees being repatriated in 1949. In all, 238,000 Germans had been placed in camps, centers and schools in Denmark (Bejder, 2016).

Additionally, refugees fleeing oppressive dictatorial regimes or war came to Denmark – many temporarily but some would remain indefinitely. For example, following the uprising against communist rule in Hungary in 1956, more than 1,000 Hungarians would make their way north to Denmark, a number which would rise to 1,400 after they were joined by family members. The 1970s saw war refugees from other European countries, such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal, as well as people from Latin America and Africa. Additionally, wars later in the decade in Chile and Vietnam resulted in refugees from the other side of the world finding their way to Denmark (Bejder, 2016).

Denmark was not the only country in Europe supporting refugees from these crises, and while there were those that would remain in the country and settle as permanent immigrants, the numbers were relatively small in comparison to the size of the whole population. Denmark, despite these levels of refugees would remain a homogenous society. However, larger economic factors made a more lasting effect on the Danish population.

The Guest Worker Programme

The aftermath of World War II left a wake of missing labor. As Western Europe was under reconstruction and larger sectors of its economy were industrialised, it became clear in the 1950s that there were not enough workers to complete all of the tasks desired by the society. Initially, this shortage was made up with the increasing push towards concentration in large cities, with the mechanisation of the historically labor-intensive agricultural sector. Later, women would increasingly enter the workforce, again making up some of the labor shortage (among other consequences for the organization of Danish society).

Yet, throughout the 1960s, it was clear that there would remain a shortage of labor, so the decision was taken (similarly to other nations such as Germany) to invite workers from, primarily, Turkey, Pakistan and Yugoslavia to make the difference. The first 'guest workers'would come to Denmark in 1967 invited by the Danish industry (Bejder, 2016). In all 6,000 immigrants would arrive by 1970, and to this day, these workers and their descendants would create one of the largest non-Western minority groups in Denmark, reaching approximately 1,2% of the population (Danmarks Statistik, 2018).

The guest worker programme was stopped in November 1973, in an agreement undertaken by a coalition of Danish industry and the government, which was then led by the Social Democratic Party (Bejder, 2016). The combination of the numbers of workers from the guest worker programme, along with the increased numbers of worldwide crisis that resulted in refugees seeking asylum in Denmark caused the Danish government to directly address the situation, which it did by setting up of a commission to create a more detailed law on immigration. This resulted in a specific legal action in 1983, which was only opposed by the Fremskridtspartiet (Danish Progress Party) (Hansen, 2016). In the following topic which is about the immigration law of 1983, the legal consequences to this law and its subsequent restrictions are going to be discussed. The social consequences of the guest worker programme on both subsequent immigration and the Danish society will be taken up later.

The Immigration Law of 1983

On June 8th, 1983, Denmark introduced a new law for immigration. The Immigration Law of 1983 is heralded by its supporters as the world's most humane immigration policy but denounced by its critics for making it too easy for people to enter the country. This debate is ongoing in Danish society. Many of the aspects of the law were already common practice in Danish immigration, but they were codified with the new law. The law is most noted for its improved conditions for asylum seekers, as well as its right to allow family members of successful asylum seekers (and other immigrants) to join their family in Denmark (Hansen 2016).

One of the primary features of the law was the institutionalisation of the concept of 'de facto' refugees, who then had a right to asylum. Though this was not part of international policy as noted in the Geneva conventions, it nonetheless had the consequence that it created a high standard of justification to send a refugee back to their homeland. Other features included the right to remain in Denmark during the asylum process, the above-mentioned right for family members to also enter upon successful application for asylum, and the right of appeal (to a special board) for those whose asylum applications were rejected.

Additionally, there was no longer a demand that the asylum seeker entered the country with either a valid visa or passport, but that so-called 'spontaneous' immigrants would also be granted permission to go through the asylum process (Folketinget, 1983). This last feature (as many of the others) has been removed in subsequent 'tightening' of the regulations. These tighter regulations would have consequences for immigration throughout the 1980s, and into the beginning of the 1990s (Hansen, 2016). There are lasting consequences as well, which will be mentioned later in this paper.

The Tamil Case (1986-1995)

In 1986, about 3,000 Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka came to Denmark, seeking safety from the civil war in their home country. This proved an opportunity for some politicians, specifically Erik Ninn-Hansen from the Conservative Party who was serving as Justice Minister, to further their critique of the Immigration Law on the grounds that it was too lax in its interpretation of what a refugee was, and too generous in its consequences for immigration and the use of public funds. Ninn-Hansen made clear, in public speeches, that he considered the Danish welfare system as an attractive incentive for immigrants, and thus Denmark needed a more restrictive immigration policy. He stated that a hundred thousand refugees would seek Denmark as a home, and that would lead to an inevitable 'alvorlig race uro' (serious race conflict) in the country, a country which still considered itself a largely homogenous nation based upon a historic Danish ethnicity.

This imagined community, to borrow Benedict Anderson's term, would help drive the rhetoric around immigration throughout this case and into Danish politics to the present day. However, the situation did not stop with a discussion of immigration, but became a scandal when actions were taken that were not in accordance with the recently passed immigration law. This action has consequences that still resonate today (Rasmussen, 2011).

The Danish media, and the government, had a public debate as to whether the situation in Sri Lanka represented an ongoing war zone, and thus whether it was appropriate to consider the Tamil asylum seekers as bonafide refugees. The civil war, in the summer of 1987, had entered a truce period, so, according to some, it was possible for the Tamil population to return to their home countries as they no longer needed asylum. This was brought up in Folketinget (the Danish Parliament), which reached no conclusion in its meeting in September 1987. However, despite the lack of any change, and with the Immigration Law still in force, Justice Minister Ninn-Hansen worked in secret to ensure that the asylum petitions of the Tamil populace were not processed and that their families thus were not given an opportunity to join them in Denmark (2011).

Having certain Tamil asylum seekers, who were supported by the Danish Refugee Council, complaining about their cases, the ombudsman began to investigate the reports of delayed or rejected applications. Seemingly in a move to limit the political impact of the critique, Prime Minister Poul Schlüter arranged for Ninn-Hansen to be promoted to the post of president of Folketinget, historically seen as a non-partisan position which arbitrated the work of Denmark's legislative body. Furthermore, the Prime Minister sought to diminish the impact of the ombudsman's report, with a public speech on April 25th 1989 in Folketinget, in which he declared that nothing had been swept under the rug (the famous 'gulvtæppe' speech) (Schütler, 1989).

However, neither of these two political maneuvers were successful in limiting the consequences of Ninn-Hansen's handling of the immigration case. Ninn-Hansen was removed from the post of president of Parliament in 1990, was voted down with a vote of no confidence in Parliament, and finally, after a report in the Supreme Court, it was determined that he had deliberately and willfully violated the law. Both Ninn-Hansen and a number of involved politicians, not least Prime Minister Schutler, were implicated. The result was that, in 1993, despite a public speech in which he denounced the report as 'erroneous', Poul Schutler's government stepped down, paving the way for Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, the Social Democratic Party Leader, to become the new Prime Minister. Ninn-Hansen was eventually jailed for his part in the case (Rasmussen, 2011).

Recent considerations of the immigration policy point to the 1987 election as a turning point in the immigration policy in Denmark. Anne Hardis produced a challenging book, which asserts that it was a conflict between Ninn-Hansen and president of the Danish Refugee Council, Gammeltoft-Hansen, which is the turning point towards the conflicted immigration policy that drives current policy. The argument is that by following Gammeltoft-Hansen's recommendations who sat on the committee that decided about the immigration law of 1983, instead of anticipating the already visible rising rates of immigration in the early 1980s, this forced a conflict for later politicians and ended with the significant tightening of regulations moving forward. While she points to a search for power rather than uncompromising policy determinations, the argument that political decisions have had lasting consequences on the immigration policy in Denmark and across Europe is convincing. It is not exclusively a consequence of world-wide conflict, but conscious decisions about how to implement policy which changes our understanding of immigrants and their descendants (Hardis, 2013).

The Tightening of Immigration Policy (1983-2001)

As a consequence, in a dramatic rise of asylum seekers in the 1980s, there was a political determination that the immigration policy needed to be tightened. One of the first consequences was the elimination of the policy of 'spontaneous' asylum – with a reinstitution of the requirement that one needed either a visa or passport to enter the country to seek asylum, barring extraordinary circumstances. Later, in the 1990s, further restrictions were made including limiting the amount of funds available to asylum seekers and tightening the requirements before family members would be permitted to join immigrants who have successfully

received permission to reside in Denmark. This took place not only under the Conservative-led government of Poul Schutler, until the resolution of the Tamil case, but also during the left-leaning government of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (which was a coalition of Rasmussen's Social Democrats (S) and De Radikale (R) (The Danish Social Liberal Party) (Hansen, 2016).

However, despite the increased focus from the SR government on immigration policy, and a tendency to restrict immigration in the face of increasing demand, immigration policy would continue to drive Danish politics throughout the 1990s, until the 2001 election led to the first government supported by the relatively new Danish People's Party, which has a primary focus on restrictive immigration policy. That government, in 2001, implemented a series of immigration reforms which, among other things, removed many of the contested features of the 1983 Immigration law (Jønsson, 2019). This included the removal of 'de facto' asylum, and the implementation of a policy of 'protective' status, which meant that applicants would only be granted asylum if they were in danger of death, torture or other inhumane conditions in their home countries.

Other restrictions target the family reunification process, increasing the number of years before permanent residency could be granted, introducing a financial guarantee, and requiring that, in the case of marriage, both parties need to be 24-year-old before family reunification could be granted. Additionally, the board that reviewed cases in immigration has been systematically reduced from 7 members in 1983, to 5 in 1995, and finally only 3 in 2001 (with the Danish Refugee Council no longer able to occupy a seat). The consequence of this is longer waiting periods, and less availability to complain about the cases (Hansen 2016).

Continued Immigration from War-Torn Regions

As mentioned briefly, the 1980s and 1990s saw a rise in levels of refugees and other immigrants coming to Denmark. As many other countries, Denmark took refugees from certain conflict areas. This included refugees in the period from 1980-1888 from the Iran-Iraq conflict, and from the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The latter conflict, with a special demonstration in Copenhagen, led the Danish government, in 1992, to implement a new law officially recognizing Palestinians as a special case of refugees (Bejder, 2016).

In 1988 the conflict in Somalia escalated into a civil war which saw more than a million Somalis seeking for asylum outside of their homeland. Some of those refugees also came to Denmark, and today, these immigrants and their descendants make the largest minority in Denmark from Africa, with approximately 16,500 Somalis in the country (Bejder, 2016).

Outside of the 1991 Gulf War, the largest group of refugees in the 1990s, also came to Denmark as a result of the war; in this case from within Europe. Nearly 750,000 people fled the conflict in Yugoslavia and sought refuge in Western Europe. In 1992, Denmark also implemented a special law which allowed refugees from the former Yugoslav republics to reside in Denmark for 6 months, with a possibility of extension. This was replaced in 1995 with the so-called 'Bosnian' Law, in which people from the former Yugoslavian republics could seek residency in Denmark, again as a special case (Bejder, 2016).

The Social Consequences of the Guest Worker Programme



Figure 1: Main countries of origin of people by migration background in Denmark (Top 5)

The number of immigrants and descendants in Denmark coming from these countries that were involved in the short-lived guest worker programme represents, today, some of the largest non-Western groups of people in Denmark.

The distinction between Western and non-Western immigrants, though not unique to Denmark, does have special consequences for the understanding of immigration into Denmark. This is perhaps especially true in terms of descendants (and due to changes in the law around citizenship, this could again affect not only the rhetoric of immigration and immigrants in Denmark, but the legal definitions and statistics moving forward as well).

For example, according to Whyte et al. (2018), "The question of asylum has been a central topic of political debate in Denmark and Europe for the past decades. Politically, the debate has been framed by an official policy of deterrence, aimed at reducing the number of asylum seekers arriving in Denmark" and at the national level it has tended to consider asylum seekers and refugees as either threats to the nation and the welfare state or as victims in need of aid and humanitarian protection.

This frame, although presented here for the situation in 2018, reflects the ongoing debate in Denmark since the introduction of guest workers into Denmark in the 1970s. In that public debate, Jens Fisker, then director of Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (The Danish Employer's Organization), wrote an editorial in the organization's publication laying out the reasons for increased employment of foreign workers – the 'Velkommen Mustafa' editorial (Fisker 1970). In that editorial, he refers to other nations use of guest workers (Switzerland in particular), argued for the economic benefits to the nation of having imported labor, and laid out the conditions in which he saw this policy could work.

However, a counter argument was presented by the Social Democratic Mayor of Ishøj (located in the suburbs of Copenhagen) in 1976. Due to the policy for asylum seekers and refugees, many asylum-seekers and refugees were transferred in such suburban areas. Per Madsen detailed, in an article in Berlingske Tidende, what he framed as an 'immigrant-problem' in the community, which had come to be made up of 10% immigrants in 1976. This, he claimed, was too high of a percentage, and questioned the division of support in Danish society. A higher percentage of immigrants concentrated in relatively inexpensive (and thus communities with a smaller taxbase) areas were thus made to shoulder the 'burden' of the relatively more expensive (in terms of social services) from immigrant communities. The crux of the argument was not about economics, but about identity with questions about the language ('when one sits on one's balcony, one doesn't hear a work of Danish'), stereotypes of immigrants as criminals ('what bothers me most is their thieving'), and questions about the future ('in 10-15 years it will be them that rule here' and 'Ishøj will end up a ghetto') (Madsen, 1976).

The reactions that Jens Fisker and Per Madsen described, map onto the descriptions from Whyte et al. between victims and threats. While Fisker emphasises the economic benefits, he is conscious of the social consequences, and Madsen, a few years later, questions the efficacy of social policies that concentrates immigrants into specific communities. The emphasis is on the inability for those communities to effectively integrate immigrants, allowing for the threat of 'ghettoisation' – a term and consideration that looms large in contemporary discussions of immigration.

Recent work in migration studies in Denmark has highlighted that some communities benefit from immigration, especially when looking at larger social forces operating in the country – even as the rhetoric surrounding immigration focuses politically on questions of integration and race. According to Whyte et al in Demark, issues have overwhelmingly revolved around 'integration problems' raised by the presence of a growing urban foreign population in the Danish welfare society. However, the urban locations are not the only places housing immigrants (Olwig & Paerregaard, 2011).

While many immigrant communities are concentrated in the outskirts of larger cities (for practical reasons), asylum centres have been decentered throughout the country – which changes the dynamic of the interaction between immigrants and the Danish populace at large. While, as Whyte et al note, "Danish national media coverage of local reactions to the opening of asylum centres often depicts two opposed positions, captured in either goodwill and civic 'humanitarianism' or resentment and 'xenophobia'" (2018, p. 3), local communities have mixed reactions. Such services, paid for by the national government in the sponsorship and support of asylum centres, provides a needed influx of money and resources to communities.

The asylum-seeking process is a long and complicated one. "A wall of visa requirements, carrier sanctions, Dublin convention procedures and so on, blocks most legal entry for what the authorities call 'spontaneous asylum seekers', meaning people who arrive in Denmark to apply for asylum. Despite the anomaly implied by the name, these are the majority of persons applying for asylum, comprising 12,512 people in 2001, the main other group being about 500 persons a year accepted from UNHCR camps around the world. Recent legislation has stopped people from applying for asylum at Danish diplomatic missions abroad" (Whyte 2003, p. 363). Once entered into the system, these potential immigrants are housed in centres across the country, with decisions taking between six months to a year (Whyte, 2003). In the meantime, "asylum seekers are housed in centres while they wait for their cases to be determined. The

Danish Immigration Service is responsible for their care and accommodation but outsources the actual running of the asylum centres" (Whyte et al., 2018, p. 7). These services are usually outsourced, where "historically, the Danish Red Cross has run the majority of asylum centres" (Whyte et al., 2018, p. 7).

While the political debate has increasingly discussed immigration, this has also come in a period in which the welfare state has retreated from the landscape, in particular in rural and suburban communities as services are increasingly centralized. The research by Whyte et al point to this as a difference between the stereotypes of immigration and the realities of life in these areas. They argue that "the arrival of asylum centres was viewed as another potential threat to the local community that re-actualized longer-standing concerns about a retreating Danish welfare state. However, this perception seldom lasted" (Whyte et al 2018, 9), the concerns having been primarily about the precariousness of rural communities rather than fear of the ethnic other and were mitigated by the infusion of additional resources because of the asylum centres. "The introduction of a well-serviced asylum centre, in other words, was in contrast to long-standing local experiences of a retreating welfare state" (Whyte, 2018, p. 10).

EU and Danish Immigration

It would be remiss to discuss immigration policy and its impact on the Danish state without mentioning the larger social and political structures that were at play in this period. It was in 1972, directly in the middle of the debate surrounding the guest workers and the fluctuations of the Danish economic and employment situations, that Denmark agreed (with 63% of the vote) to join the fledgling European Community. The 1980s, under the leadership of Poul Schütler and foreign minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, from the Danish Liberal Party (Venstre), there was a general movement towards more integration within Europe. This period corresponds with the passing of the immigration law of 1983, as discussed above, with openness towards immigrants and the European community at large. However, a series of debates and a referendum in 1992 (on the Maastricht Treaty) has led to a stronger debate not only on immigration but also on the international dimension of Danish society.

In 1992, Denmark, with a small majority (50,7%) rejected the EU treaty, which led to the eventual adoption of a series of 'opt-outs' for Denmark's membership in the EU. Denmark, for example, does not participate in the Euro, nor in areas of common defense and justice and home affairs (Sørensen, 2018). This last category directly affects asylum policy and continues to be a point of difference in implementing international standards such as the Dublin convention. The strength of the debate since the mid-80s through 2001, and still nowadays, has seen immigration policy that has come to the fore in Danish politics. The Danish Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) and its subsequent interaction, the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) has achieved its size and influence on the basis of its stance on immigration, and that issue continues to drive question not only in Denmark, but in countries throughout Europe, once again demonstrating that while Denmark has a particular migration history, the larger forces within international politics also drive the debate and reactions to a large extent.

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France

Introduction

This research paper focuses on the migration phenomenon that took place in France during the second half of the 20th century, more specifically the main waves during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, known as “the third Migration Wave”. The demographic, economic and political impact that shaped (and still shapes) France is identified. Also, the tensions related to migration and the approach of France in comparison to other European countries are analysed.

The framework

In France, INSEE uses the more selective definition proposed by the High Council for integration in 1991, according to which an immigrant is “a person who is born a foreigner and abroad, and resides in France” (INSEE, 2016). Thus, people who were not born in France, are not immigrants, which is the case of repatriates from former colonies. That is why in 2010, the United Nations estimates that 11.1% of the inhabitants are immigrants in France, while the INSEE only finds 8%. On the other hand, people born in the colonies who became foreigners at the time of decolonization are considered as immigrants when they returned to live in France, even if in some cases they were automatically reinstated their French nationality. Thus, among the population of Algeria and the Muslim faith, among whom are the Harkis, only about 42,500 people are considered as repatriated in 1968. Most of these people, and especially all those who arrived after 1968, are considered immigrants by the INSEE.

The definition of refugee is more complex due to its legal connotations. Three different types of protection are taken into consideration that migrants can apply for, if the legal prerequisites are fulfilled: refugee status, constitutional asylum, subsidiary protection and statelessness. Refugee status is recognized by OFPRA (Office Français De Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides) pursuant to Article 1(A)(2) of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 (Genova Convention, 1951, p. 14).

Constitutional asylum: OFPRA is competent to recognize the refugee status to “any person persecuted for his action in favor of freedom” (Article L.711-1 of CESEDA). The essential criteria for admission to refugee status on this basis are:

- the existence of persecution suffered in the country of origin, not just the fear of persecution;
- to be deprived of protection by the State of which the applicant has the nationality or, in the absence of the established nationality, of the country of habitual residence;
- an active commitment to the establishment of a democratic regime or to defend the values attached to it, such as freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of association, freedom of association, etc.;
- a commitment dictated by considerations of general interest and not of a personal nature. People likely to fall into this category are, for example, journalists, associative militants, artists, intellectuals ...

Regardless of the legal basis for granting refugee status (constitutional or conventional - within the meaning of the Geneva Convention), the system of protection is identical: the refugee will enjoy all the rights attached to refugee status as defined in French law.

Subsidiary protection: The benefit of subsidiary protection is granted to any person whose situation does not meet the refugee definition but for whom there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would run a real risk of suffering in his country. One of the following serious attacks:

- the death penalty or execution;
- torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
- for civilians, a serious and individual threat to his life or person due to indiscriminate violence resulting from a situation of internal or international armed conflict (Article L.712-1 of CESEDA).

Statelessness: The status of stateless person is recognized by OFPRA to anyone who meets the definition of Article 1 of the New York Convention of 28 September 1954: “the term stateless person shall apply to any person who is not considered by any other State to be his or her returning person under the law”. OFPRA exercises the legal and administrative protection of stateless people.

Quick overview on the current situation

France had the reputation into the early 20th century of being the European country most open to immigrants, including political refugees. The immigration situation in France has been strongly influenced to the present day by the legacy of colonialism of earlier centuries as well as the long tradition of recruiting foreign workers. Overall, there has been a steady increase in immigration over the last century, and this has had a strong impact on the nature of French society. Although immigration has been regarded as a success story in economic terms, in the past three decades it has increasingly been perceived as the root of social problems. Therefore the situation changed in the late 20th century, when opposition rose to continued immigration from Africa. Most immigration conforms to the economic needs of the host country and tends to be particularly concentrated either in periods of economic growth or after devastating wars.

The last available data (2011) show that there are 3,7 millions of foreigners live in France (INSEE : The national institute of statistics and economic studies), most of them living in Paris (and its metropolitan area), as well as the Mediterranean coast. Of these 3,7 million foreigners, 43,6% comes from former French African colonies: Algeria (773,742), Morocco (721,963), Tunisia (265,549) and other African countries (833,032); 37,8% comes from European countries such as Italy (246,209) and Portugal (615,132) and other 27 European countries (719,324); whilst 14,6% comes from Asia (REF).

	Immigrants		1st generation born in France		2nd generation born in France		Total	
	Workforce (thou-sands)	%	Workforce (thou-sands)	%	Workforce (thousands)	%	Workforce (thousands)	%
Africa	1930	47,0	2667	47,4	880	18,8	5477	38,0
Maghreb	1257	30,6	2110	37,5	821	17,6	4189	29,1
Algeria	529	12,9	1142	20,3	563	12,0	2235	15,5
Morocco	541	13,2	694	12,3	130	2,8	1365	9,5
Tunisia	187	4,5	273	4,9	129	2,8	589	4,1
Sub Saharan Africa	673	16,4	557	9,9	59	1,3	1288	8,9
Asia	691	16,8	620	11,0	133	2,9	1444	10,0

	Immigrants		1st generation born in France		2nd generation born in France		Total	
	Workforce (thou-sands)	%	Workforce (thou-sands)	%	Workforce (thousands)	%	Workforce (thousands)	%
Turkey	216	5,2	238	4,2	48	1,0	501	3,5
South-East Asia	124	3,0	126	2,2	36	0,8	285	2,0
Other Asia	352	8,6	257	4,6	49	1,0	657	4,6
America-Oceania	199	4,8	139	2,5	37	0,8	374	2,6
Europa	1289	31,4	2197	39,1	3626	77,5	7111	49,4
EU25+ Norway, Switzerland and Iceland	1048	25,5	2081	37,0	3541	75,7	6670	46,3
South of Europa	625	15,2	1545	27,5	2326	49,7	4497	31,2
Italy	103	2,5	569	10,1	1260	26,9	1931	13,4
Spain	107	2,6	383	6,8	750	16,0	1240	8,6
Portugal	416	10,1	593	10,6	317	6,8	1326	9,2
Poland	59	1,4	127	2,3	445	9,5	631	4,4
Germany	78	1,9	129	2,3	230	4,9	437	3,0
Belgium-Luxembourg-Switzerland	118	2,9	141	2,5	408	8,7	667	4,6
Other EU25+ Norway and Iceland	167	4,1	139	2,5	132	2,8	439	3,0
Other Europa	241	5,9	115	2,1	84	1,8	441	3,1
TOTAL	4108	100,0	5622	100,0	4677	100,0	14407	100,0

Nearly 30% of the people below 60-year-old in metropolitan France are of foreign origin. More than three out of four immigrant grandchildren are of European origin. Thus, second generation descendants of Italian migrants are nearly twice as numerous as the immigrants and the first generation combined. The three generations taken together and under the age of 60 have nearly 2 million people. In total, over three generations, nearly one inhabitant under 60 years out of 7 is of European origin.

Unfortunately, the situation is extremely precarious in some areas of the country with people living under pitiful conditions. For instance, more than 200 tents essentially occupied by Afghan people are installed at the gates of Paris, behind the Porte de la Chapelle and Porte de Clignancourt where 250 people live on sidewalks, around campfires. A total of 14 associations have signed a text calling on the president to honor his commitments, including Médecins sans Frontières, Secours Catholique and Emmaüs. We estimate around 4,000 migrants to have lived on the street at the end of the winter 2019, and 1,200 were placed into accommodation spaces promised by the state representative, while 40 to 50% of asylum applications are made in Ile-de-France (Paris region).

We also have the Calais' Jungle issue: migrant and refugee camps established in the early 2000s in Sangatte, Coquelle, neighboring cities of Calais, and Calais itself, near the French entrance of the Channel Tunnel. It was several times dismantled by the police. These makeshift camps have seen its population increase sharply following the closure of the Sangatte center in 2002 and the migration crisis of 2010, hosting eventually about 1,500 people out of a total of 6,000 in October 2015. Refugees and asylum-seekers are from Afghanistan, Darfur, Syria, Iraq and Eritrea, and attempt to enter the United Kingdom on stowaways, ferries operating on the route with Dover from the port of Calais or by trains using the Channel Tunnel (Eurostar, Shuttle).

The "Third immigration wave": from the post-World War II era to the mid-late 70s

In France, the major immigration phase within the last 75 years is called the '3rd immigration wave'. It started after the Second World War and concluded with the end of the Trente Glorieuses (the 30-year period from 1945 to 1975).

Pull factors

One of the main reasons why France was keen to accept foreigners was the post-World War II context and the reconstruction of the country. The main pull factor was the need of workforce for the post war reparations and a thriving economy that needed more people in order to keep rising.

After World War II, France looked for workforce into its colonies to rebuild the destroyed cities and countryside, or to fill the factories and fields that were emptied due to the war casualties, and thus to restart the industry of the country. People from the former French colonial empire including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mali, Senegal, Congo and Guinea were recruited, something which led to a large population displacement. Important public urbanisation works were supported by the low-cost manpower, first from the colonies and then from Portugal and Spain. Indeed, 1,5 million foreigners were working in France in 1974. It should be noted that during this period the population was about fifty-two million people. The workers were set up in hotels or in large slums such as the most widely known, the Nanterre's slum, in the north-western suburb of Paris, where 14,000 immigrants lived during the 60's.

At the same time, the SONACOTRA, the NAtional SOciety for housing's COnstruction for foreigner workers (TRAvailleurs), was reformed to build hostels and consequently solve important squalor and hygiene problems. In addition to the fact that these slums were a public health threat, they were also a potential source of instability. Among many other factors, what drove the Government to take action and remove those "states into the state" was a political interest and the need of creating some sort of safety and stability for the several slum's inhabitants. All along its existence, the SONACOTRA built and ruled over more than 71,000 housing places, before the Society was renamed ADOMA (from latin ad doma) in 2007 and expanded its actions to the social integration not only for migrants but for homeless and

travelers too.

Since the construction of the first SONACOTRA hostel in 1959 in Argenteuil, their numbers kept rising, especially between 1966 and 1972, because of the exodus of Algerian French. On the other side, this policy of social housing was part of a social control that concerned the workers social classes since the second half of the 20th century. It was clearly about maintaining the control over the workforce, which showed the unwantedness of the migrant's integration. "Temporary housings for temporary workers" was the motto of the reconstruction laws during the 50's & 60's.

Push factors: Different places, different factors

The migration phenomena in France cannot only be explained by the need of workforce after the Second World War. In addition to the aforementioned pull factors, there were also a number of push factors that played an essential role in the Third Wave, namely the Algerian War of Independence in the case of Algerian migrants.

Moreover, the context of the decolonization also played an important role. In 1954, two important events hustle the French colonial empire: Indochina got its independence after a ten years war in 1954, and Algeria started rising up against the French occupation. This political instability and the withdrawal of the European influence led for example more than a million of Algerian French – including many thousands of Algerian Jews –, the Pied Noirs (Black-Feet) to sail back to the continent between 1962 and 1965.



Figure 2.: Foreigners of African or Turkish origin (%0) in France

The Pied Noirs' migration was one of the most important population displacements in modern French history. The Pied Noirs were people of European (mainly French) origin born in Algeria during the French rule and came back to France after the independence of the former French colony. This group was forced to leave without any sort of financial compensation despite the Evian Accords between France and the temporary government of the independent Algeria. For this reason, the properties of the Pied Noirs were largely subtracted or destroyed by the scorched earth policy. Around a quarter of the Pied Noirs arrived in France with literally nothing. During the 60s, the Pied Noirs' repatriation did not happen as expected: the newcomers were perceived as a threat by many metropolitans, in particular the inhabitants of the southern half of the country.

Politics were contesting this enormous wave of immigrants too and opposed themselves sometimes to grant temporary housing to the Algerian French by accusing them to maintain links with some activist cells like the NLA, the National Liberation Army, who already organized terrorist attacks in French territory during the years of the war. These motives were mainly unfounded and caused an active racism against the Pied Noirs calling them the "Evian's profiteers". The Pied Noirs were set up in old barracks or newly built hostels, just like the SONACOTRA ones if they were lucky enough and were not left by themselves. Despite this, most of them established little communities in the periphery of cities or directly in small villages in the countryside.

Despite the fact that it technically happened after the "Trente Glorieuses", another important event that it is worth mentioning the "Boat" crisis in 1979. France did welcome more than 120,000 refugees from Indochina/Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. We can still object that if this reaction came so quickly it was because of the Cold War context, and because the ones who were fleeing were escaping from communism. This decision acted as a symbolic strike against the east bloc.

France and its assimilation model

Before presenting some information about the impact immigrants have on French society, it is important to give an overview on the French "integration" model, which is based on the idea of assimilation. According to Barou (2014), assimilation entails the acculturation of immigrants, which requires that they adopt the "majority culture" and are absorbed into it.

The main instrument of the assimilationist French model was the public school (J. Barou, 2014). The idea of a unitary public-school system was not created for the purpose of migrant integration. In fact, it has a much longer history: the French Republican School, this is, the public-school system, dates from the mid-19th century and the Jules Ferry laws. What is more, the assimilationist and centralising tradition in France dates from the French Revolution and even before. This particularity of the French model is essential in order to understand the impact of migration in France.

In overall, although this model brought upward social mobility to some of the immigrant descendants, has not been able to mitigate the levels of inequality among immigrants and people with migration background, which is one of the main causes of the failure of this policy (Barou, 2014).

Demographic, economic and political evolution in France between 1946 and 2016 model

France stopped looking for foreigner workforce long ago. In 1974, in response to the economic crisis, the “work migration” was officially halted because there was no need of recruiting more workforce anymore. This change of approach led to a new struggle: the recognition of these populations as citizens. During this time, young people with migration background started rebelling and denouncing discrimination, fighting for its place in the French society. Marches were organised, such as the “Beurs’ march” (meaning ‘Arab’ in the popular language), which took place in 1983, one of the most widely known.

Consequently, institutions were created in order to tackle the social problems that had their roots in the newly formed multicultural society in France and the lack of social integration of third country nationals. For instance, the High Council for Immigration was created in 1990. At the same time, some legal reforms were made in order to simplify the application process for residence and work permits by 1984. The goal was to allow immigrants who were already settled in France to integrate better in the French society. One of the main changes was the possibility to legally move around and settle all over the country.

Concretely, Algerian French strongly participated in the demographic development and revaluation of Southern France. From 1962 to 1968, they caused a 50% demographic growth in Marseille and Perpignan, 60% in Toulon, and 70% in Nice. If it were not for this, these cities would have depopulated even more due to the fact that people were moving to the big metropolitan areas, especially during the Trente Glorieuses and particularly to Paris, where most of the employment opportunities were at the time.

Still during the 80s, immigration was a topic that played an important role in the urbanization of cities and peripheral towns. Schools were reorganized around Priority Education Areas to fight against school failure and to spread the values of the nation in the less integrated suburbs. Conflictive districts were target of specific policies in order to tackle “ghettoization”, exclusion and communitarianism. At this time, immigration was mostly accepted as part of the “Providence State” doctrine. With racist and xenophobic attitudes on the rise along with extremist political movements, organizations like “SOS Racism” were born in order to fight such behaviours. French politicians and iconic personalities from different sides agreed on the necessity of counteracting the rising racism and xenophobia.

This event shall however remind us of the Mediterranean migrants and the current context. Today’s situation is barely comparable. Since the 2000s, French politics have been having a negative approach towards the migration issue. In 2009, the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, declared that immigration would have a negative impact on the conception of the French national identity by trying to undermine it, which had a huge impact on public opinion. This reflects the big polarisation of the French public opinion in regard to migration and the usage of this issue for political purposes.

Nowadays France is like its European neighbors, trying to deal with the migratory issue and the Refugee Crisis. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Statistics, at the beginning of the year 2018, France had accepted 334,951 living permits for humanitarian reasons. This is equal to 50 refugees for each 10,000 inhabitants, whereas these have been

of 117 in Germany, 131 in Austria, or 243 in Sweden. It was mainly due to Merkel's decision to welcome Syrians Refugees in 2015 that France followed the lead. Otherwise, the government would have never acted this way, probably avoiding the issue in the same way they did when the Aquarius' wanted to land in French port. Moreover, the Mediterranean Migration Trends are one of the causes of the current diplomatic tensions between France and Italy: France recalled its ambassador in Rome on February 7, 2019. Following the social movement in Algeria against the candidacy of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika for the next presidential elections, Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Front, stated on March 12th 2019 that the government should suspend the granting of visas to Algerians to prevent a possible "migratory influx".

What about today?

From 1975 onwards, family reunification applications skyrocketed. Until the early 2000s, the family reunification permit was the main way a foreigner could bring his or her family and legally reside in France. In 2010, family-related immigration accounted for 45% of the 194,000 entries in the country, of which 27% were foreign connections to a French family and 8% family reunification. Faced with this, immigration for economic reasons accounts for only 9% of admissions. The other reason for immigration of increasing importance in the 2000s is studying, with 31% in 2010.

The population of Maghreb origin has mostly arrived in France following decolonization. These two cultures face a common past since France had invaded the country, took control of it, imposed its directives and subjugated the entire population. The remains of multiple traumas can turn into a desire for revenge for some descendants who constitute the new generations. They feel that their ancestors were used by the country and did not have the recognition and living conditions they deserved. Despite the measures aiming at combating discrimination at work, in public places, in institutions, the question remains very sensitive.

France has problems recognising its actions and usually tends to justify itself by making excuses regarding colonization and war in Algeria. Part of the new generations feels that there is some sort of debt that France should pay, not only for the occupation and the colonial empire, but also for soldiers coming from the colonies who gave their lives fighting in the two World Wars and the workers who helped reconstructing the country after the conflict. First, second and third generation migrants struggle nowadays for their cultural roots to be recognised. These are close to the cultural background of new migrants from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq (i.e. their language and religion are the same).

According to those who oppose migration, a successful integration is based on the idea of assimilation, following the assimilationist tradition of France: adoption of French names, traditions of the territory (or even of the catholic religion) and thus renouncing their own traditions or at least having to hide their practice. According to these perspectives, migrants must fulfill a certain profile in order to be "welcomed": they must be hardworking, discreet and grateful. France never had to live in a situation of exodus, other than the Second World War, when the inhabitants of the northern part of the country occupied by the Germans fled seeking refuge in the south of France, called "free" under the Vichy regime. But this exodus occurred within the country itself. The work of empathy is is therefore more difficult since France cannot appeal to its own memory.



Figure 3.: Asylum applicants in France

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Germany

Introduction

The main topic of this research paper is the influx of Guest Workers, the so-called Gastarbeiter in Germany (literally Guest Workers) during the 50s, the 60s and the early 70s in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the economic, social and political causes and consequences. The reason behind the selection of this topic is the fact that it was the first time in modern history Germany received a big influx of culturally heterogeneous and distinct groups, ranging from Spanish to Turkish people, as well as Greeks, Tunisians, etc. Nowadays, it is widely accepted that Germany is a migration country, but that was not the case until recently. In this regard, the Gastarbeiter phenomenon was a turning point, as it boosted the German economy, but also changed its society, culture, demographics, etc. Thus, we cannot understand Germany without the Guest Workers who came during the second half of the 20th century, the multicultural societies that were born as a consequence and the integration policies that followed.

In order to contextualise this phenomenon, the study provides a short overview of the migration dynamics in Germany in the past. Additionally, the push and pull factors, the numbers and precedence of guest workers as well as a quick overview of the integration policy are described. Furthermore, a reflection on how the Guest Workers phenomenon shaped the German society and its consequences that can be seen nowadays, is provided.

Why do we focus on the Federal Republic of Germany?

The initial idea was to try to compare data from West and East Germany, but this option was rejected after a rather long research due to several reasons. Firstly, it is true that the DDR also received Guest Workers, but they were way fewer in numbers and it did not have such a big impact as it had in the West German society. In fact, this topic and its consequences will also be discussed in this text. Secondly, there is not a lot of information available. Even the institutional documents do not provide in-depth information about third country national in the German Democratic Republic. Lastly, the few data we could have access to are not from highly reliable sources.

A brief look at history

Migration trends are a constant phenomenon in human history; they are dynamic and continuously shape the societies we are living in. The movement of different populations and groups has a changing nature that depends on several variables that can be clustered in the so-called push and pull factors.

Germany is not an exception. During the last decades, Germany has been a receiving country, which means that this country has been the destination for third country nationals, meaning refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, etc. However, this has not always been the case: if we take a look at the history of modern-day Germany it turns out to be quite dynamic in terms of migration flows, internal and external (Hanewinkel & Oltmer, 2018).

For instance, during the 16th century and the 30 Years War, the devastation caused by the conflict led the policy makers of the time to take measures towards the lack of labour force. In order to do so, they recruited employable people from other overpopulated areas, thus creating a migration phenomenon and what we would call today a receiving “country” (Hanewinkel & Oltmer, 2018).

The transatlantic migrations, on the other hand, were movements of people from German speaking territories, especially to the United States of America that took place up until the late 19th Century. “From the 1680s to the year 1800, more than 740,000 people emigrated from German-speaking regions to Eastern, Central Eastern and Southern Europe. And from 1816 to 1914, more than 5,5 million German migrants departed for the United States” (Hanewinkel & Oltmer, 2018). Due to the progressive industrialisation of Germany, the emigration trends gradually declined.

The first half of the 20th Century was mainly shaped by the two World Wars and its economic, political and social consequences (Hanewinkel & Oltmer, 2018): movements of people due to the warfronts, refugees running away from the Russian Revolution and the Russian Civil War, Jews escaping from pogroms and other sorts of religious persecution in Eastern Europe, exiles fleeing the country facing persecution from the National-Socialist regime, employment of forced labour, late and post-World War II population movements, including the relocation of German populations inside the new borders of the country (Potsdam Agreement, 1945), etc.

At the beginning of the second half of the 20th Century, the economic and social context led German policy makers (both from West and East Germany) to tackle the problem of lack of workforce by recruiting the so-called Gastarbeiter (guest workers). However, the division of Germany into the Bundesrepublik Deutschland and the Deutsche Demokratische Republik established two different paths.

Economic boom and need of workforce: pull factors

The Gastarbeiter agreements were a direct consequence of the economic growth that West Germany experienced after World War II (Jacoby, 2003). As Eichengreen and Ritschl point out, "between 1950 and 1960, the GDP in West Germany grew at an average of 8 percent per year, much faster than in earlier German history and faster than in Europe as a whole" (Eichengreen and Ritschl, 2008, p. 33).

The Wirtschaftswunder and its reasons are still debated. It has been generally accepted that the Marshall Plan played an essential role in the German Economic Miracle, which would have probably taken longer to come in case the United States did not apply this initiative towards the reconstruction of Europe (Kimmel, 2005). Some claim "that there was in fact strong reconstruction growth. On the other hand, reconstruction growth is unable to fully explain Germany's growth record, as growth rates in the 1950s and 60s were significantly higher than the pure reconstruction model predicts" (Reichel, 2002, p. 441).

Be that as it may, West Germany was in need of workforce due to the Wirtschaftswunder. In the initial stages of the economic recovery, the demand of workforce was partially covered due to the ethnically German populations relocated in the new borders of Germany. However, the Wirtschaftswunder reached a point in which these numbers were not enough (von Koppenfels, 2002 in Von Koppenfels & Höhne 2016), which led the policy makers at the time to recruit workers from other countries. Under this circumstance, "the recruitment agreements were first signed with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960) and later on with Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968)" (Apostolopoulos, 2017, p. 2). The aforementioned agreements lasted until 1973, when the Federal Government decided to stop the state-organised labour migration (Butterwegge, 2005).

It is important to take a brief look at the connotations of the word Gastarbeiter, as it explains what was expected from the foreign workforce employed in Germany during these years. The word Gastarbeiter literally means "guest worker". Thus, being a guest implies a temporal stay in the country in order to leave at some point in the future. In other words, they were not considered as migrants. What is more, "German politicians famously stated for many years that Germany was 'not a country of migration'. A turning point was the Independent Migration Commission's 2001 report which noted that 'Germany is, in point of fact, a country of migration'" (Unabhängige Kommission "Zuwanderung" 2001, p. 164).

A few years later, in 2011, the Finance Minister at the time, Wolfgang Schäuble, declared that "when we [the Federal Republic of Germany] decided 50 years ago to invite workers from Turkey, we expected that their children would integrate automatically" (The Guardian, 2011). The fact that this migration phenomenon was (and still is) considered as an invitation gives a clear insight on the different positions of power (the inviter versus the invited) and the postulates of Germany in regards of immigration, movements of people and integration of third country nationals.

Push factors

In order to understand the push factors of the Gastarbeiter phenomenon it would be necessary to have an insight into the profile of the guest workers and the socioeconomic context of each of their countries of origin. Thus, it would be necessary to study the countries of origin one by one. However, it could be said that the main push factor was a precarious economic situation in the country of origin and the option of looking for better opportunities in a flourishing economy like the one West German enjoyed at the time.

Gastarbeiter in numbers

The following chart shows the number of foreign workers employed in the former territory of the German Federal Republic per year and country of origin, from 1954 to 1973.

The time frame covers from 1954, this is, one year before the first agreement was signed with Italy, to 1973, when the Federal Government decided to stop the state-organised labour migration.



Figure 1.: Employed foreign workers in the federal territory according to selected nationalities. Data are obtained from the Field Report on Foreign Workers (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 1974).

This influx of foreign workforce covered the demand for labour of the West German economy, being thus one of the reasons why the country was able to hold the economic growth of the Wirtschaftswunder.

However, the information the chart provides is not complete, since it shows the number of employed foreign workers. Many of them left, but many others stayed and brought their families with them. The reality is that "a number of migrants did return to their home countries, but the overall number of non-German citizens in Germany rose from 3,9 million in 1973 to 4,6 million in 1980, or 7,4% of the population (Rühl, 2009; OECD 1997, p. 162).

> *"We asked for workers, but people came" the writer should be added "We asked for workers, but people came."*
>
> *Max Frisch*

Beyond the economic impact of employing thousands of foreign workers from different countries, and despite the fact that they were considered as guests in Germany, social and political consequences followed.

It is considered by many that after 1973 a new phase started. After the decision of cancelling the agreements for recruiting foreign workers was made in 1973, the West German foreign policy aimed at facilitating a temporary integration for the families of the previously recruited foreign workers (Butterwegge, 2005). This "confronted the guest-workers which did not originate from an EEC-State with the dilemma of either leaving Germany and return to their home-country, or to prepare for a long-term stay and to bring their families along" (Apostolopoulos, 2017, p. 4).

According to the data, the majority of the Gastarbeiter in the year 1973 were from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Italy, followed far behind by those coming from Greece and Spain (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 1974). The data Destatis (2018) shows that those with migration background , being Turkey their country of origin, are the 14,4% of the population with migration background living in Germany: a bit less than 2,8 million people. Those of Italian origin are the 4,6% (859,000), 1,1% of Spanish origin (217,000) and 2,7% of Greek origin (438,000). Also, 1,6% of Serbian origin, 1,9% of Bosnian origin, 2% of Croatian origin and 2,2% of Kosovar origin. This means that at least the 7,9% of the population with migration background are originally from the former Yugoslavia. However, we cannot know the real numbers because the sources that have been collected, do not provide specific information about Slovenia and North Macedonia.

The institutional response: integration policy in Germany

First, it should be noted that guest workers, as the name implies, were not supposed to stay for a long period of time, let alone to become citizens of Germany. Thus, the integration policy of the Federal Republic was reduced to short-term legal reforms, such as regulating the immigration of foreigners to densely populated areas in order to avoid social conflicts, followed by the family reunification processes (Seifert, 2012).

The year 1979 is of special importance, as it was a turning point regarding the conception of foreign people living in Germany and therefore how this social phenomenon should be addressed. This new understanding was made possible thanks to the Kühn-Memorandum, the first report coming from a federal political institution advocating for the recognition of the Gastarbeiter as actual migrants and promoting real integration measures. Which is to say, it recognised the responsibility of Germany towards the migrant population (now recognised as such) and the need of a solid integration policy, being education one of the main pillars

of the proposal (Motte & Ohliger, 2009). This political change opened a new phase in the Integration Policy of the Federal Republic (Seifert, 2012).

However, despite the big political impact the Kühn-Memorandum had, the aforementioned report was never fully put into practice because of the end of the coalition government in 1982. Be that as it may, the policies tackling migration were aiming at three main objectives: the limitation of migration, promoting the return of third country nationals and integrating the former guest workers and their families (Schulte, 2011). During these years, as Schulte (2011) points out, the main lines of action in terms of social integration were employment and social equality and facilitating vocational training programmes. Education also was one of the main concerns of the policy makers of the time. The education system was not ready to deal with non-German speaking pupils during the 60s and the 70s, hence the reason for adapting the school system to different languages and language adaptation (Seifert, 2012).

The development of the integration policy was rather slow. It must be noted that, as it has been mentioned above, the fact that the political spheres of the country did not recognise Germany as a migration country until the 2000s had its consequences. This is, if a country assumes that there are no migrants living within its borders, no integration policy is needed because there is virtually no group to be integrated in the society.

The current picture

Despite the insistence of the West German political elites stating that Germany was not a country of migration, the truth is that this has been the case since the second half of the 20th century. The Gastarbeiter phenomenon might has been the first big influx of foreign people moving to Germany, but it was not going to be the only one. The economic prosperity of Germany has been a pull factor for many migrants and asylum seekers during the last decades, becoming one of the most popular destinations if we take its net migration rate into account (World Bank, 2017).

The following charts display the proportion of the population with and without migration





background in the year 2017, as well as the most popular countries of origin of those with migration background (Destatis, 2018):

The current picture shows a mixture of people of different origins and cultures. Turkey is the biggest minority nowadays because of the Gastarbeiter who came decades ago and brought their families with them. Moreover, during the last few decades there has been a constant influx of immigrants. People of Italian origin are one of the biggest minorities as well, both because of those who came decades ago and the economic migrants that moved to Germany thanks to the freedom of movement that the European Agreements allow.

In other words, the Gastarbeiter phenomenon set the cornerstone of the future of Germany as an immigration country. This turning point had (and still has) profound implications. Economically, as it has been discussed before, they allowed the Economic Miracle of the 50s (Von Koppenfels & Höhne 2016) by covering the need of workforce. Demographically, the migration flows entailed a population growth of around 4,6 million people by the 1980s [Rühl, 2009; OECD 1997 (in Von Koppenfels & Höhne, 2016], p. 162). What's more, the guest worker phenomenon led to a multicultural environment that set in motion a process that would change the political culture of the country, as well as the perspective of the political elites towards third country nationals and integration of foreigners, which led to the implementation of integration policies.

Exposition to multiculturality

However, the consequences of the aforementioned phenomenon go far beyond. According to a study carried out by the ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, "Inhabitants of regions with only limited previous experience of immigration might react more vehemently to incoming foreigners than those living in areas with a high share of pre-existing migrants" (Entorf and Lange, 2019, p. 36). This is the basic premise of the "defended neighborhood" hypothesis of Green et al. (1998).

The difference exposure towards migration in West and East Germany resulted in societies with different experiences. The former has a wider experience of migration because of early inflows of third country nationals (Gastarbeiter); whereas the latter did not have that much contact with groups of migrants until recently. According to Entorf and Lange (2019), this

is the most solid explanation of the highest rates of hate crime in Eastern Germany. In fact, “the probability of a newly arriving asylum seeker becoming a victim of a hate crime in East Germany is ten times greater than in West Germany” (Entorf and Lange, 2019, p. 29).

The different attitudes towards migrants are also reflected in the results of the anti-migration political party, Alternative für Deutschland, in the different German states:



AfD Vote % by German State (https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de)			
Saxony	25,4	Bavaria	10,5
Thuringia	22,5	Rhineland-Palatinate	9,5
Brandenburg	19,4	Bremen	9,3
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	18,2	Saarland	9,3
Saxony-Anhalt	16,9	North Rhine-Westphalia	8,1
Baden-Württemberg	11,5	Lower Saxony	8
Berlin	11,4	Schleswig-Holstein	7,5
Hesse	11,2	Hamburg	7,3

Thus, among many other variables such as history, political culture, economy, etc., there are several evidences that indicate that exposure to multiculturality makes societies more open and welcoming.

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Greece

Introduction

This research paper is focused on the case of Greece and the great migratory movement from Albania during the 90s which turned Greece from an emigration to an immigration country. This study tackles several of the historical, social, political and economic reasons that led to this migratory movement as well as explains its impact on the Greek society through a social, economic, demographic and political perspective. In addition, the current migrant and refugee crisis is briefly presented explaining the challenges that Greece is facing being already hit by the economic crisis since 2011.

Definition of terms

Migrants usually move from their country of origin to other countries seeking better living conditions. The term Immigration describes “the citizen outside of a European Union who has entered lawfully or illegally in Greece with a view to find temporary or permanent work”. (IEEP, 2005, p. 9-10). Immigrants typically must have the necessary papers to leave the country of origin and enter another country, as well as to pass through third countries if needed.

These people are not illegal by definition, but the action of irregular migration can be related to three different categories depending on the case. First, entering another country irregularly constitutes a crime by itself, since the person who enters the country hasn’t got the necessary papers. Second, illegal residence in the country, despite the fact that the person has entered lawfully, means that he/she makes abuse of duration or purpose of residence (visa, residence permit or authorization) and third, we have the phenomenon of working illegally (without any sort of work permit).

On the other hand, there is usually a confusion with the term refugee, which is defined under international law. No matter if we are talking about migrants or refugees and their different legal status, both use the same routes, the same means of transportation, same traffickers and networks, and suffer the same human rights violations. The possibilities in order for people coming from developing countries to legally enter a developed country are rather limited, and, in case they do, it is complicated to renew the residence permit. Not mentioning the restrictive immigration and asylum policies third country nationals, being these refugees or migrants, have to face throughout the whole process.

Generally, the main reasons for immigrating are a precarious economic situation in the country of origin, overpopulation, political instability, armed conflicts, ethnic cleansing and human rights violations, among others. For example, an economic crisis that cripples the economy of a given country or a radical change in the working and living conditions that forces people to migrate to nearby or remote destinations so they can have a life with dignity. On the other hand, armed conflicts, ethnic cleansing, human rights violations, political oppression and environmental disasters are the main causes of forced migration. For example, hampering the continuation of productive activities or radically changing working and living conditions in the country of origin by forcing people to migrate to nearby or remote destinations to survive (Triantafyllidoy, 2015).

More specifically, this paper intends to give an overview on two large migration waves from Albania to Greece, as well as the impact they had on the country.

Description of a time span with strong migratory movements in Greece

The first, although small, wave of migrants entered Greece during the 70s. This moment was also when the repatriation of Greek Gastarbeiter started. Moreover, Poland became the first country to send migrants to Central Europe by the mid-80s, opening the way for the rest of the former communist states that followed.

The late 80s, more specifically the year 1989, was a turning point both from a geopolitical and historical perspective, especially for Europe, but also at a global level. The event that triggered all these changes was the fall of the Iron Curtain and the USSR, resulting in a new geopolitical order. The collapse of the former socialist regimes, the transition and the integration of immigrants are global phenomenon that has shaped our societies (Leka, 2013). These changes entailed population movements to southern European countries (Dustmann & Frattini, 2012).

Political upheavals, war conflicts, dissolutions of regimes, multi split of the countries of south eastern Europe led to intense migratory movements. Another factor was the opening of the borders of Albania (Petrakou, 2001).

One of the consequences of this situation was that countries that have traditionally been sending countries, such as Greece, became receiving countries. At the same time, countries that did not experience migration in their recent history, such as Albania, had to deal with large numbers of people fleeing the country (Ventoura, 2006).

Description of the causes of migration (push and pull factors)

The reason why people were emigrating from Albania, this is, the push factors, were diverse and cannot be understood if they are taken into account separately. Thus, the main push factor was the socioeconomic context. It must be noted that the country lived for about fifty years under a policy of isolationism. The Albanian isolationist policy not only highly restricted the transit to other countries, but also the movements of population within the state.

In 1990, after five decades of isolationism, Albania had to face several political, economic and social changes. The country changed from communist system to a democratic and multi-party one; from a planned economy to a market economy; from a restrictive policy regarding the movements of people to opening its borders and allowing mass movements of people (King, 2005).

Causes of immigration	(%)
Poverty and unemployment	74,50
Social and cultural causes	22,00
Political reasons	3,50
TOTAL	100

Figure 1.: Causes of immigration from Albania. Source: IOM, 2006. Albanian Migration Current Situation. Page 108 cited in Leka, 2013.

The main destinations in Western Europe for Albanians were Greece and Italy, in that order. Actually, in a time period of 20 years after the collapse of communism, 500,000 Albanians left for Italy and 800,000 for Greece. In addition to this, 500,000 people migrated to Germany, France, Belgium, Canada, USA, Switzerland (Leka, 2013).

The reasons why Greece became a receiving country, this is, the pull factors, were the political stability of that time and its entry to the European Union. For Albanian emigrants, Greece was a country where someone could enjoy better working and living conditions.

The economic ties between Greece and Albania due to the geographic proximity was one of the factors that, in addition to what was mentioned above, created an attractive socioeconomic context for Albanian migrants in the Hellenic Republic. Furthermore, Greece's geographical location was a determining factor since Greece is considered as the "eastern gate" of Europe, with lengthy coastlines and borders that are easy to cross. The transition was either by foot through the mountains or by boats through the Ionian Sea. However, many people were deported to Albania as soon as they reached the Greek border.

Description of the impact of the migration movements in Greece in social/ economic/ demographic/ political terms

Albanian immigrants had a beneficial impact from the economic perspective since the Greek labour market was experiencing a lack of workforce at that time. Although Greece was one of the least developed countries in Europe during the 1990s, the financial situation of Greek citizens had improved considerably, creating new needs and new socio-economic conditions. In addition to this, due to the inclusion of women in the labour market, caretakers and domestic workers were in high demand, positions which were covered by Albanian immigrant women.

Another important characteristic of the Greek labour market was the educational level of the Greek population. The universalisation of high level education in Greece resulted in a lack of workforce when it came to non and/or non-qualified jobs. Thus, most of these positions were filled by Albanian immigrants. Most of them were working in seasonal industries such as agriculture, construction and tourism. These industries created a demand for a flexible and cheap labor pool.

Despite this, Greece was not ready to host this large influx of immigrants at all. That can be seen on the fact that the first regularization programme for irregular migrants was announced in 1997 and the second in 2001. These two programmes made clear that during the early 90s there was not a relevant legal framework to monitor the entry of immigrants. There was only an outmoded law dated back to 1929 that was regulating the mobility and establishment of foreign people, including matters such as the border police, passport control, extraditions and expulsion.

The new immigration crisis, which was the result of the collapse of the communist regimes, made clear that this situation had to change. During that period there was a big reversal worldwide that had been caused by several historical, social, economic and political events. For example, it was the postwar period and the end of the Cold War. The memories and remains of the socialist past were still alive not only in people's minds but also in the economy and

social life. Furthermore, the oil crisis was another event that disrupted the global balance, alongside with the immigration wave that had started from the post-communist regimes. Due to the fact that other European countries were applying strict immigration policies, Greece had to face a big challenge in order to control the situation and create a legal framework and an immigration policy (Pegiou, 2011).

According to the 2011 census, most of the Albanians settled in Attica prefecture and urban areas such as Athens and Thessaloniki. In Athens, Albanians are the larger immigration group (51,12%). Moreover, by studying the age and the sex of those who settled in the country in the period 2006-2011, it appears that the majority are young people. Most of them are between the age of 20-29, while the numbers of people over the age of 60 are fewer (Manos et al, 2017).

In order to understand the actual impact of immigration, it is important to examine the numbers not only of Albanian immigrants, but generally the population that came in Greece at that period. There have been attempts to produce reliable statistical data but the results were not of high accuracy. According to government estimation in 1999, there were about 500,000-600,000 immigrants, number that represent up to a 12% of the labor force. However, some believe that this number goes up to 800,000.

Furthermore, in the early 80s Greece accepted the settlement of around 200,000 Greek citizens and ethnic Greeks from Egypt, Zaire, Cyprus and Turkey who were considered political refugees. Approximately 50,000 of them were Pontic Greeks, who settled in the USSR from Asia Minor after 1922 and continue migrating in Greece due to economic and social difficulties, at an annual rate of 10,000 (Fakiolas and King, 1996).

During that decade and the one that came after, the most prominent group of immigrants were Albanians with a number of 150,000 according to Petrinioti (1993) and as much as 500,000 according to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also, according to data cited by Lianos (2001) obtained from the Greek Institute of Employment, during the last regularization effort, from the 350,000 immigrants applied for white card, 230,000 were immigrants from Albania.

At this point it would be interesting to present the impact of immigration not only in Greek economy and society, but also in the everyday life of the immigrants themselves. Despite the fact that wages in the black market in Albania were 3 to 6 times lower that in Greece, Albanians had to face everyday insecurities, dangers and fears. For example, that fears have to do with constant threat of deportation. In addition to this, more than half of them do not have a social insurance, which means that they do not have the right for the basic medical care or for a proper pension. Most of them have low social status because of the kind of jobs they did or because they have difficulties with the language. Nevertheless, integration in the Greek society is easier for second generation migrants when compared to first generation immigrants.

The current migration challenges in Greece

In the last 30 years Greece turned from an emigration to an immigration country. Today the country is faced with an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Greece currently hosts approximately 186,200 refugees and asylum-seekers, the majority of whom stay in the mainland. However, there is still a big number of asylum seekers that remain on the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Kos, Samos and Leros. The vast majority of them cross Greece on their

way from Turkey to Northern Europe and so far, less than 1% of them have requested asylum in Greece (OECD, 2016). The countries which the refugees and asylum-seekers mainly come from are, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan and Iraq. Europe's refugee crisis has posed great risks for the Greek economy which has been in crisis since 2011 needing substantial help in order to deal with the migratory flows (International Rescue Committee, 2019).

During the second half of 2019 saw a sharp increase in new arrivals, with over 74,600 people (80% by sea, 20% by land) compared to the 50,500 that arrived in 2018 (64% by sea, 36% by land). A critical entry point for migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers into the EU, Greece has been a key focus in Europe's efforts to halt refugee flows. Since the EU-Turkey agreement in 2016, a policy of geographical restriction has left large numbers of people stranded on the Aegean islands for months in hard conditions. The country's immigration detention practices are not appropriate, including the detention of children in facilities that are unequipped, the lack of individualised assessment and the use of police stations for immigration detention purposes (Global detention project, 2019).

Yet the unprecedented flow since 2015 changed the responses to reception and integration by public authorities at all levels. At the national level one of the consequences of the increased migration inflow has been the formulation of a new National Integration Strategy by the Ministry for Migration Policy that has been under consultation. The new National Integration Strategy foresees the cooperation and involvement of all policy levels (central, regional and local) and actors (national authorities, local authorities, organisations, NGOs, public and private sector), while it highlights the role of local authorities, which have a crucial role to play in diversity management and migrant integration. At local level the increase in new arrivals deepened the relation between the municipality and non-state actors establishing a much more active interaction in formulating, funding, implementing and evaluating reception and integration policies (OECD, 2018).

Conclusion

In Greece, as well as in the rest of the European south, the majority of immigrants who came "illegally" have been part of the illegal labor market, characterized by unskilled and low wage jobs, with limited opportunities for them to improve their social and professional status. Greek immigration policy still does not ensure the appropriate institutional framework and the responsibility of their integration is shifting more to the immigrant themselves as well as to the local host societies. There are categories of immigrants such as Albanian family men and others who showed significant adaptability to the labor market but also to society. This results in their advancement in the professional and social pyramid and their better integration and integration in relation to other categories of immigrants who did not have the same opportunities or were not given the same opportunities.

According to the "International Migration law" No. 16 "Integration is a permanent feature of European society; of the 474 million Nationals and legal foreign Residents of the EU, European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland, some 42 million were born outside their European country of residence there" (Leka, 2013). Although integration is considered a responsibility of the State, in the case of Greece the burden turned to citizens and immigrants, making the process of integration a complex and difficult interplay between locals and third country nationals. Taking into consideration the socio-economic situation throughout Europe, as well

as the increasing migratory flows which result to the rising of the far right, all these phenomena lead to the need of creating a modernised legal framework on migration and integration.

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Hungary

Introduction

The aim of this research paper is to place migration processes in a wider context, to show that migration is a constant phenomenon and is closely linked to the development of our societies. The main facts about the current situation regarding the phenomenon of migration in Hungary are presented followed by the definition of key migration terms. Two different migration movements are analysed and compared; the first one in the 90s and the second one after 2010. The current situation with reference to numbers of migrants and refugees moving into Hungary is analysed along with the causes of migration. The final part of the research includes a short description of the migratory movements' impact and the creation of migration policies.There is a decrease in the Hungarian population. Besides the natural decrease, since 2008 a strong migratory movement has started from Hungary to Western EU countries (similar to other Eastern European EU countries).

In Hungary the ratio of foreign citizens compared to other European countries is relatively low (1,6%). Two thirds of the migrants arrive from European countries, mainly neighboring countries. Many of the migrants are national Hungarians with fluent language skills, Hungarian cultural background, and network in Hungary. However, during the last two decades the ratio of non-European migrants (mainly from Asia) slowly increased. The main pull factor is employment for immigrants, but also studying possibilities, and - mainly among ethnic Hungarians – family reunification is also important.

The migration policy in Hungary has had two different sides in the last decade: it has been a solution for the lack of workforce of the Hungarian labour market. The request of working permit became much easier for people coming from neighboring countries (mainly from Serbia and Ukraine) in the last four years. On the other hand, at the policy level, the prime minister declared that "Hungary won't be an immigrant country", therefore, EU and state funds with integrational purposes were stopped completely in 2018.



Definition of terms

(by the author)

- Migration: cross border movement between countries for more than a 90 days-time period.
- Emigration: movement of Hungarian citizens who leave Hungary and go to another country and stay there longer than 90 days.
- Immigration: movement of non-Hungarian citizens who come to Hungary and stay in the country longer than 90 days.
- Beneficiaries of international protection: Hungary ratified the Geneva Refugee Convention on 1st March 1989. The following categories exist in the current asylum system in Hungary: refugees, persons admitted for subsidiary protection, persons enjoying temporary protection.
- National migration: Ethnic Hungarians from other countries immigrate to Hungary.
- Transit country: For many immigrants, when entering Hungary, the main aim is to enter the EU in the long run and leave to Western European countries for work, and therefore they do not settle in Hungary.
- Foreign citizens: Third country nationals who are living in Hungary but are Hungarian citizens. They constitute only a part of the immigrant population and mainly represent those who arrived in recent years.
- Foreign-born population: A wider group of immigrants including also immigrants who arrived earlier and obtained citizenship.

Description of time span

The following paper focuses on migration movements in Hungary in the 90s and after 2010 until recent times. These two periods have been chosen because of the opening of the borders that followed the socialist era in Eastern Europe, which had a strong effect on national migration in Hungary. This event was a turning point regarding the status of Hungary in the international migration flows, since its accession to the European Union it became one of the “gate countries” to the EU.

According to the statistics of Hungarian Central Statistical Office, the number of foreign citizens who were staying in Hungary (holding a valid residency permit) in 2018 were 162 thousand people, which was the 1,6% of the whole population of Hungary. That ratio is relatively low compared to other European countries. Looking at the statistics of the last 17 years, this ratio was doubled between 2001 and 2011 from 1.1% to 2.1%, then there was a high decrease to 1,4% in 2012. During the last 7 years this ratio slowly increased from 1,4% to 1,6%. Partly, the reason for this was the slowly growing number of foreign citizens, but the other reason is the decline of the Hungarian population.

Year	Foreign citizens staying in Hungary	Number of Hungarian population	Ratio
2001	110,028	10,200,298	1.08%
2002	116,429	10,174,853	1.14%
2003	115,888	10,142,362	1.14%
2004	130,109	10,116,742	1.29%
2005	142,153	10,097,549	1.41%
2006	154,430	10,076,581	1.53%
2007	166,030	10,066,158	1.65%
2008	174,697	10,045,401	1.74%
2009	184,358	10,030,975	1.84%
2010	197,819	10,014,324	1.98%
2011	206,909	9,985,722	2.07%
2012	143,361	9,931,925	1.44%
2013	141,357	9,908,798	1.43%
2014	140,536	9,877,365	1.42%
2015	145,968	9,855,571	1.48%
2016	156,606	9,830,485	1.59%
2017	151,132	9,797,561	1.54%
2018	161,809	9,778,371	1.65%

Figure 1.: Number of Hungarian and foreign citizens staying in Hungary. Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2019.

During the 90s, 90% of the immigrant population came from Europe, and only 10% from non-European countries.

> *"On the basis of empirical research (Citizenship survey in 1995, and Immigrants survey in 2002) it seems that more than 90% of immigrants coming from neighboring countries – 75% of all immigrants – have a Hungarian ethnic identity. An identical situation can be observed with regard to foreign citizens obtaining labor permit. And among the people gaining Hungarian citizenship the ratio of ethnic Hungarians is even higher. [...]'*
>
> *In order to understand the causes of this migration, we have to keep in mind the fact that in the neighboring countries – historically once the territory of Hungary – there are large groups of Hungarians living in minority, the members of which, or their ancestors, were once Hungarian citizens. The biggest Hungarian minority lives in Romania, in Transylvania."(Gödri, 2005, p.169.)*

Around 1990, a huge inflow of migrants came from Romania because of the Ceausescu era, ethnically related fears and the unstable situation, and until now Romania stayed the first sending country. Through the 90s, Yugoslavia and the post-Yugoslav countries were the second main sending countries because of the conflict in the Balkans. In addition to this, there was a much lower but a constant flow from Germany. The migratory movement from Ukraine and China become really significant by 2000.

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Europe	122,917	122,411	120,558	123,923	124,084	125,784	93,197
Romania	68,439	65,705	61,579	62,130	57,357	57,343	41,561
Serbia	15,297	16,173	15,449	14,250	15,223	15,571	12,664
Ukraine	3,501	4,432	5,625	7,184	9,898	11,016	8,947
Germany	7,427	7,802	8,277	8,985	9,396	9,631	7,493
Poland	4,628	4,521	4,297	4,471	4,386	4,144	2,279
Russia	277	1,124	1,708	2,502	2,809	3,002	1,893
Slovakia	231	461	600	968	1,571	1,717	1,576
Croatia	305	532	688	929	1,069	1,162	917
Austria	616	694	872	1,031	990	1,053	694
Asia	9,635	11,419	15,004	16,721	18,243	19,326	12,603
China	3,469	4,276	6,639	7,809	8,306	8,861	5,819
America	2,895	3,197	3,722	4,210	4,512	4,677	2,488
USA	1,700	2,008	2,420	2,835	3,132	3,261	1,636
Africa	2,081	2,210	2,488	2,659	2,594	2,559	1,233
Australia	573	717	734	750	812	779	507
TOTAL	138,101	139,954	142,506	148,263	150,245	153,125	110,028

Figure 2.: The number of foreign citizens in Hungary divided by origin (1995-2001).
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2019.

In this regard, Gödri (2005) gives an interesting insight on migration flows to Hungary:

> *"Hungarians coming in the late 1980s from Romania as refugees migrated due to the tragic political and economic situation, but many of them referred to ethnic discrimination against Hungarians. During the 1990s the main motivations for migrating into Hungary were disillusionment, economic and social difficulties arising from the long economic transition. The disadvantages of a minority status were also mentioned although less frequently than before. In addition, the pull effect of family members, relatives and friends migrating to Hungary earlier also appeared.*
>
> *Immigrants from Yugoslavia came first in greater numbers in the early 1990s during the Yugoslavian war and then in 1999 when there was a new military conflict. Frequently the motives of those coming during the first wave were direct threats to their lives. Refugees of Hungarian ethnic origin coming from Voivodina (a province in the North of Serbia not affected by the wars) were mainly afraid of retaliation and military service (Gyurok, 1994). The migratory movement was maintained by poverty and unemployment related to war and by the relatively slow changes in the political and economic spheres (Gábrityné, 2002).*
>
> *There has been a slowly increasing immigration flow from Ukraine, which became independent in 1991. The main reasons of this movement were related to the economic difficulties of the country: high rates of unemployment and hardships in everyday life. The economic difficulties hindered the realization of the highest migratory potential among the Hungarians living in the Sub-Carpathians (Örkény, 2003). At the same time there were strong indications that "incomplete migration" (Okólski, 1998), especially taking temporary jobs and "commercial tourism", was much more widespread than the actual immigration into Hungary.*
>
> *Based on the above it is clear that in the three main sending countries, economic factors played a very important role in the start of the migration process beside political and ethnic considerations." (Gödri, 2005, p.171.)*

Also, in the academic year of 1999/2000, the majority of foreign students studying in Hungary were citizens from Romania, Ukraine, countries of the former Yugoslavia and Slovakia (Rédei, 2002). During this period more than 40% of immigrants settled down in the Central Hungarian Region (Budapest and Pest county), and another trend was among the immigrants from neighboring countries to settle down in a neighboring county on the Hungarian side of the border.

At the end of the 90s a significant secondary migration flow can be observed. "This is the migration of retired parents following their children already living in Hungary, which form is most significant among immigrants coming from Romania." (Gödri, 2005, p. 173)

In 2004, Hungary joined the European Union, which opened a huge market for the Hungarian workforce and become a new pull factor for immigrants to apply for Hungarian citizenship. Since 2008 a migratory movement can be observed from Hungary to Western EU countries (similar to other Eastern European EU countries), and the ratio of emigrants has constantly grown in the last decade, which has raised the decline of the population of Hungary. The main pull factors are the economic and welfare differences. The probability of migration – based on previous research – is higher among the higher qualified young men. (Hárs, 2016, p. 246)

Current situation (trends after 2010)

The calculation of foreign population in Hungary rely on two data sources, along with an evaluation based on the outcome of the latest census. These two data sources are the number of the residency permit holders which covers at least three months residence based on the registration of the Immigration and Asylum Office (which was 216,000 at 2017), and the number of foreign citizens staying in Hungary on a reported address according to the personal data and address register of the Ministry for home affairs (170,000 people) (Microcenzus, 2016).

According to the 2016 micro-census, 96,7% of the population is Hungarian citizen since their birth, 1,9% (184 thousand people) gain Hungarian citizenship by naturalization, and 1,4% (137 thousand people) are foreign citizens. The ratio of those who were born abroad is 3,8% (365 thousand people), 2/3 of them are Hungarian citizens (Microcenzus, 2016).

The ratio of foreign citizens living in Hungary has not changed significantly since the last census in 2011 (in 2016 the 1,4% of the population). The ratio of those Hungarian citizens who were born abroad has decreased since 2011 (in 2016 2,5% of the population); 85% of them came from four neighboring countries; 56% of them from Romania.

Nowadays, the composition of the population of foreign citizens is slowly but steadily changing. As Romania joined the EU, and the borders opened up towards the Western countries, there is a constant decrease of the numbers of Romanian citizens living in Hungary (as well as Serbians). After 2015 the ratio of foreign citizens from Europe decreased steadily down to 64%, meanwhile the ratio of people from Asia increased up to 28%, Africa to 4%, and America to 3,4%. In 2018 among the first five sending countries were Romania (14%), China (12.3%), Germany (11%), Slovakia (6%) and Ukraine (6.5%).

Country	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Europe	110122	104963	101,538	100501	105825	99,194	104,254
Romania	41596	34795	30,924	28641	29665	24,040	22,747
Serbia	8281	4894	3,051	2430	2426	2,312	3,356
Ukraine	11894	10849	8,317	6906	6749	5,774	10,503
Germany	15834	17418	18,669	18773	19403	18,627	17,879
Poland	1385	1631	1,863	1964	2129	2,061	1,928
Russia	2864	3390	3,657	4341	4935	4,903	4,790
Slovakia	6705	7573	8,275	8744	9393	9,519	9,652
Croatia	676	674	650	831	1012	1,064	1,221
Austria	3331	3702	3,917	3990	4007	4,021	3,743
Asia	24733	27037	28,832	33868	39238	39,937	44,692
China	10114	11504	12,716	16467	19811	19,111	19,905
America	4713	4899	5,102	6008	5408	5,397	5,891
USA	3060	3102	3,021	3090	3299	3,198	3,373
Africa	3284	3850	4,492	4985	5513	5,985	6,334
Australia/other	509	608	572	606	622	619	638
TOTAL	143361	141357	140,536	145968	156606	151,132	161,809

Figure 3: The number of foreign citizens in Hungary divided by origin (2012-2018)
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2019.

In 2018, half of the foreign population living in Hungary settled in Budapest, a third of them in towns (out of Budapest), and 17% of them in villages (Népmozgalom, 2017.). More than half of the people live in the Central Hungarian Region: 48% of those who were born abroad, and 58% of the foreign citizens have residency in this region.

Looking at the trends of the last two decades the ratio of women and those who gained university diploma or high school degree were always lower among the Hungarian citizens who were born in Hungary, than among the migrant population.

Description of the causes of migration (push and pull factors)

According to the statistics of Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Office, the main purpose of stay for immigrants was employment. In 2018, more than half of the immigrants (56%) applied for this reason. In the last few years, studying in Hungary also become a popular purpose (in line with the increasing number of state funded scholarships).

Purpose of stay	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Pursuit of gainful activity	13,010	12,650	14,500	25,637	62,362
Studies	10,615	12,576	14,103	19,258	29,039
Family reunifications	7,742	6,984	5,740	5,397	8,198
Other purpose	5,576	5,895	5,254	5,714	6,820
Official	1,611	1,742	1,843	2,120	2,799
Other purposes of stay	929	499	515	797	2,061
TOTAL	39,483	40,346	41,955	58,923	111,279

Figure 4.: Number of applicants who request residence permit, according to the main purposes of stay (per capita). Source: Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Office, 2019.

In case of foreign citizens and Hungarians who were born abroad there are typical fields on the labor market where they are present in a higher rate compared to the Hungarian average. In line with their higher education, their ratio is higher in those jobs which require higher educational degree in self-employment. Moreover, the rate of foreign citizens is higher in trade and service sector than the average. In other occupational sectors they show similarity to the whole population (Microcenzus, 2016).

According to the workforce-survey (Statisztikai tükör 2015/48), which was conducted in 2014, the most preferred way of getting a job in Hungary among migrants is through networks. Among those employees who worked maximum five years in their current job, 42% found their job through networks. The less and most educated migrants use their networks less frequently to find a job than the average. Among the first generation of migrants, the help of relatives or friends is even more important than at the whole population (often that gave the first push to migrate). 8,3% of migrant employees (age 15-64) considered that they did not need their level of qualification for their job.

Even though the integration to the Hungarian labor-market is quite successful among the foreign citizens (the rate of unemployment is much lower in this group compared to the whole population), xenophobia in the majority of the society can be an obstacle. According to the results of a small survey, which was conducted in 2017 (Dajnoki, Kőműves, 2017) among Hungarian employees, more than half of the people who took part in the survey did not agree with migrant integration into the labor-market. However, they did not feel competition with foreign employees. About the possibility of working together with migrants most of them could not make a clear decision. According to their opinion the main reasons to employ migrants are the lower wages and poorer working conditions, which would have a negative effect on the society and economy (higher unemployment rate).

Description of the impact of the migration movements

“Along with the decrease of the Hungarian population, its age composition is also changing in an unfavorable direction: the number of people of an economically active age is dropping gradually, while the dependency ratio of the elderly is growing, which will lead to a series of economic, social and budgetary problems over the long term; much of this is already noticeable. Even though the age composition of the immigrant population is relatively young, the level of immigration is too low to be able to solve the problem of the ageing population.” (Hungarian Demographic Research Institute, 2014, p. 55).

Which policies emerged as a result of the migration movements?

The migration policy in Hungary is quite two-sided in the last decade: As a result of the state policy, naturalization process for those national migrants who applied for citizenship became easier after 2011. As a solution to the lack of workforce of the Hungarian labor-market in the recent years, it became easier to get a working permit in Hungary for citizens from Ukraine and Serbia who are working as skilled laborers. The number of international students is increasing in line with the growing number of state funded scholarships for foreign students. On the other hand, on the policy level the prime minister declared that “Hungary won’t be an immigrant country”, therefore EU and state funds with integrational purposes where stopped in 2018, the borders are closed for asylum seekers, and the rate of xenophobia has never been so high in the Hungarian society.

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Migration in the Republic of North Macedonia (1991-2017)

Introduction

Since 1990 North Macedonia faced significant changes in terms of economic, demographic and social development. The period covered in this research, whose historical, economic and social features is reviewed, is the period since the Republic of North Macedonia gained independence. The autonomous, sovereign and independent Republic of North Macedonia was established under the Declaration of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, SRM, on 15 January 1991, and this determination was confirmed in the independence referendum on 8 September 1991.

Throughout this period, North Macedonia was facing a number of crises caused both by external and internal factors. These crises have had a major impact on the State economy, which was further undermined by the economic blockade of neighboring Greece due to the unresolved name dispute.

Due to the socioeconomic and political situation of the country, the phenomenon of migration into the Republic of North Macedonia is rare. However, the phenomenon of emigration into more developed countries is constant since the Republic of North Macedonia became an independent state. In this Research Paper, the Migration terms are first explained, followed by the identification of the Migratory movements' pull and push factors explaining the reasons why North Macedonia is mainly a transit country. The emigration phenomenon is described giving reference to the reasons why the people of the Republic of North Macedonia emigrated to other countries. Finally, the migration trends and patterns are discussed.

The Migration terms explained

Migration is the movement of people from one place to another. This movement of people includes all kinds of them, regardless of their length, type and reasons and it refers to the migration of refugees, displaced people, economic migrants and people who migrate for other purposes, including family reunification. Migration can be temporary or permanent. Temporary migration involves the everyday movement of people from their original place of residence to another place for business purposes, but after a while they return to their initial place of residence. Permanent migration means people leaving their homes permanently and never going back. Migration can also be internal and international. Internal migration is the migration that takes place within one country, while international migration is the movement of people from one country to another. The most frequent reasons for migration are demographic, political, economic and social. The subject matter of this research is international migration (Nikolovski, 2010).

The concept migration background has three different categories: first, third country nationals who were not born in the country of residence; second, those who were born in the country of residence but have at least one parent who immigrated to the current country of residence; third, people who were born as a stranger in that country. The migratory status is determined on the basis of their characteristics in terms of immigration, naturalization and citizenship and the relevant characteristics of his/her parents. The international migrant stocks are the number of people who were born in a country other than the one in which they live. Refugees also fall under this group. The data used to assess the international migrant stock at a certain period of time obtained mostly from population census (UN, 2018).

Migratory movements: push and pull factors

The push and pull factors for migratory movements that apply to all the countries in the world, regardless of their level of development, include the general social/economic/demographic and political characteristics. These primarily include the fast rise in the supranational flow of capital, trade and technology, which have had significant implications in the scope, intensity and nature of international migration over the past two decades. The great demand for labor in the developed economies and the better job availability in the undeveloped economies have triggered global labor migration. The vast labor market allows employers to employ migrants as part of the strategy to minimize expenses.

Furthermore, the demographic changes, given that the annual birth rate in the undeveloped countries is six time higher than in the developed countries, compel the developed countries to accept the migrants because of their aging population. Migration is also required to retain the economic growth, the social welfare and the high standard of living. The immigrants, especially the offspring of the current immigrants, are the key source of labor on the labor market, but the hopes of the latter for increased social mobility usually remain unfulfilled because of lack of qualifications. Most of them are therefore limited to holding traditional, unattractive, low-paid and risky jobs.

To get a clear picture of the influence of immigration on the Republic of North Macedonia and compare its positive and negative implications, the statistical reports indicate the number of foreign residents living in the Republic of North Macedonia. The inflow of migrants and

refugees indicates that they always move to third countries, so their percentage in the country is insignificant. What is interesting here is the number of foreign citizens with a university degree who bring knowledge and technologies with them, thus contributing to new professional habits, management methods and the like. They stimulate the economy and adapt it to the global standards. Through their activities, many sectors have been modernized and new export markets and jobs have been opened.

The importance of migration in economic terms can be noticed from certain indicators of positive economic effects, such as remittances, certain investments in the Republic of North Macedonia, both foreign investments and investments of Macedonian expatriates, transfer of technology, management development, stimulating innovations, deterring monopolistic tendencies, spillover effects, foreign direct investments, transfer of managerial skills and the like.

The country's strongest affiliation with migration – according to an IOM research report was in 1998, when the Kosovo (Province of Serbia) crisis resulted in approximately 360,000 Kosovar Albanians fleeing to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the rate of 1,000/ day at the height of the movements, the majority of whom returned to their homes in Kosovo (Province of Serbia) by mid-1999. Nowadays, the number of refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs is relatively small (755 IDPs in 200790), nearly all are ethnic minorities from Kosovo, particularly Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians who fled in 1991.

According to the data of the North Macedonian Labor and Social Policy Ministry and the 2015-2024 Demographic Policies Strategy of the Republic of North Macedonia, the number of international migrants in five years, that is, from 2008 until 2013, was 2,950. This confirms the fact that the migrants consider North Macedonia as a transit country (MTSP,2015).

Due to this, the government has adopted the 2015-2024 Resolution on Migration Policies of the Republic of North Macedonian (MTSP,2015) and the 2015-2024 Action Plan on Migration Policies of the Republic of North Macedonia to identify the principles of migration policies of the Republic of North Macedonia and the guidelines and purposes of its migration policies in compliance with its efforts to make comprehensive and consistent policies for all the aspects of the migratory processes. For the purpose of detecting the migratory intentions of the citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia on time, the migratory potential of the population is being monitored constantly both at a national and regional level in order to pinpoint the specific measures and activities in this area. For this purpose, appropriate methodology needs to be adopted on the basis of which the migration potential of the country could be estimated. The reduction in the scope or the potential for emigration would be possible by reducing the impact of the push factors. Therefore, a number of institutions need to make joint efforts and assume an all-encompassing approach to improve the status of the young people in the society, the quality of their life and primarily improve their employment prospects.

The aforementioned ministry has also adopted the 2017-2027 Strategy for Integration of Refugees and Foreigners in the Republic of North Macedonia, which is addenda to the 2008-2015 strategy (MTSP,2008). This strategy is aimed at integrating the people who have been granted the status of a recognized refugee or subsidiary protection in compliance with the Asylum and Temporary Protection Law. This strategy also covers the people who have been granted a permanent residence permit or any other category of foreign citizens who have been granted temporary residence permit by the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia and people who need help with integration.

Migration as a transit country

The official data on the number of migrants have been obtained from the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2015), according to which the Republic of North Macedonia hosted refugees coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) and Croatia after it gained independence in 1991. The number of migrants increased in 1999 as a result of the Kosovo conflict. All in all, a total of 400,000 refugees from the region, of whom 360,000 from Kosovo, were given humanitarian protection. Most of them have already returned to their home countries, while 812, mostly Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (RAE) from Kosovo, have stayed in the country. 19 of them have obtained a refugee status, while 553 enjoy subsidiary protection. They have been included in the process of local integration by receiving residence permits. Finally, the refugee status of 240 Kosovo residents has been either denied or revoked, but they have been allowed to stay in the country until they return to their home country voluntarily or until they regulate their stay in the country in compliance with the Law on Foreigners on the basis of family relations with North Macedonian Citizens.

The Republic of North Macedonia is a transit country for migrants and refugees heading to the EU. Many of those migrants become asylum seekers as a temporary solution. In 2011 the Republic of North Macedonia received 744 asylum applications from people who did not come from the region, which was a fourfold increase compared to 2010. In 2012, the number of asylum applications was 638, while in 2013 the number of asylum applications rose to 1,353. In 2014 there were about 1,289 new asylum seekers from 19 different countries, while, until the end of June 2015, a total of 1,446 people, more than half of whom were Syrian residents, applied for asylum. Reports indicate that 90% of the asylum seekers in the Republic of North Macedonia leave the country and depart for the EU member states even before an interview is done or a first-instance decision is made.

Since 2005, the Republic of North Macedonia has been an EU candidate state, while in March 2012 it has launched the High-Level Accession Dialogue with the EU. The European Commission is monitoring the progress of the Republic of North Macedonia, so the accession process is expected to strengthen the asylum system with the adoption of the legislation that complies with the legal instruments that jointly form the Common European Asylum System. In 2015, the government started working on a new asylum law in compliance with the EU's revised asylum instruments, which should have been adopted in 2016. As usual, the UNHCR is taking part in the making of this law.

North Macedonia is not an attractive destination for migrants because of its low GDP. According to the State Statistics Bureau data obtained from the annual reports of the business entities and other sources, the 2017 GDP amounted to 616,600,000 denars. The actual GDP growth rate in 2017, compared to that in 2016, was 0.2% (The State Statistical Office, Republic of North Macedonia, 2018).

The following areas cover most of the value added in the 2017 GDP: wholesale and retail, motor vehicles and motorcycles repair, transport and warehousing, as well as accommodation and catering services (20.0%). Investments accounted for 135.318,000 denars of the 2017 primary assets. As for the technical layout of the investments in the primary assets, construction works accounted for 61.0%, machines and equipment - 31.5%, and other investments -7.5%.

Because of all stated above, North Macedonia has been designated as a transit country on the Western Balkan route, which the EU-bound migrants use. The number of migrants who

wish to stay in the country is insignificant, but, because of the increased number of foreign investments, according to the Employment Agency (AVRM) records, the number of foreign citizens employed in North Macedonia over the past few years has increased by 2.5%. The AVRM granted work permits to 1,437 foreign citizens back in 2010, while in 2017 this figure reached 3,589. Among them, 626 received work permits, while 2,963 were granted temporary residence permits (The Employment Service Agency of the Republic of North Macedonia, 2017).

According to the qualifications of the foreign citizens, 42 have completed PhD studies, 50 - MA studies, 77 - specialized studies, 1,283 - a first cycle of studies, 1,544 have completed secondary education, while 593 have obtained other kind of education. Regarding the country of origin, 1,037 come from Turkey, 427 from Serbia, 317 from Greece, 244 from Kosovo, 196 from Albania, 152 from Bulgaria, 144 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 84 from Croatia, 81 from Germany and 72 from Ukraine. However, in percentages, the total number of foreign residents is extremely small, which confirms the thesis that migrants do not choose the Republic of North Macedonia to be their host country.

The phenomenon of emigration

Emigration is not a recent phenomenon and – according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia– one can distinguish several events/reasons that have caused large flows of people along years. The Balkans wars of 1912-1913, the First World War, the Second World War, the Civil war in Greece (1945 – 1949) have led to massive emigration to USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In the 60s emigration was triggered mainly by the poor economic situation of the country and the main destinations were Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden while smaller numbers found their way to Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, and Norway. The poor economic performance in the 1990s, the Kosovo crisis and the 2001 internal security crisis increased the number of emigrants and asylum seekers from the (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) Republic of North Macedonia (International Organization for migration, 2007).

One of the factors that influenced the decision of the young and highly qualified cadre to migrate was the distorted system of values since the country gained independence. First of all, there is the disrespect for their efforts, undermined competence, limited prospects for professional and personal promotion, inability to achieve progress in their line of work, as well as partisan employments that are not based on a principle of values, but membership to a certain political party. In this widespread system of privileged people that assume no responsibility, emigration was always the first choice.

The number of emigrants increased further with the EU visa liberalisation, which was introduced on 19 December 2009. The initial wave of emigrants was completely uninformed of the immigration laws in the countries of destination and they were partially manipulated by all kinds of profiteers. The EU, which had had previous experience of this kind because of the earlier emigration from other Eastern European countries, reacted harshly, asking the Republic of North Macedonia to restrain the trips that were used to take advantage of the visa waiver to seek economic asylum in the EU countries.

The number of emigrants from the Republic of North Macedonia is hard to determine and it is even harder to provide valid information about the current situation. These figures range

from 350,000 to 2,000,000. This is due to several factors. The citizens rarely abide by the obligation to report their stay abroad if it is longer than three months. Furthermore, in order to avoid the visa regime, many citizens of North Macedonia have taken out passports from other countries, primarily Bulgaria, which has greatly improved their work prospects in the EU countries. Bulgarian Deputy President Iliana Lotova said at her meeting with the Prime Minister Zoran Zaev and the Assembly Speaker Talat Xhaferi of North Macedonia that the number of the country's citizens who had taken out Bulgarian passports over the past 16 years was 71,524. The emigration to and illegal work in the EU countries still exist, but the number of migrants tends to reduce each year because of the strict regulations.

According to migrationdataportal.org, the official number of emigrants in 2017 was 534,700. Although the most popular destinations are recognized, the number of emigrants living abroad is unknown.

Year	No. of emigrants
1990	429,600
1995	491,200
2000	531,300
2005	459,300
2010	465,400
2015	497,400
2017	534,700



Figure. 1: Number of emigrants in the Republic of North North Macedonia through years (UN, 2017)

Migration: trends and patterns

The current statistical data on the number of people with a migration background currently living in the Republic of North Macedonia vary depending on the sources, so it is difficult to determine because the last census is more than 20 years old. Moreover, there is no standardised registration of the population in North Macedonia. However, the United Nations provides data in this regard. Its estimates cover a time span starting from the moment when the Republic of North Macedonia gained independence:

Age range	1990			2000			2010			2017		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
0-4	1,674	1,555	3,229	2,783	2,669	5,452	2,919	2,736	5,655	3,009	2,860	5,869
5-9	1,212	1,144	2,356	2,150	2,098	4,248	2,755	2,588	5,343	2,771	2,639	5,410
10-14	797	815	1,612	1,606	1,495	3,101	2,274	2,147	4,421	2,548	2,435	4,983
15-19	1,353	1,640	2,993	1,032	1,089	2,121	1,636	1,624	3,260	2,109	2,069	4,178
20-24	1,976	2,880	4,856	1,744	2,193	3,937	1,371	1,554	2,925	2,153	2,335	4,488

25-29	2,072	3,134	5,206	2,537	3,851	6,388	1,808	2,440	4,248	2,190	2,783	4,973
30-34	2,668	3,917	6,585	2,658	4,192	6,850	2,399	3,712	6,111	2,466	3,671	6,137
35-39	3,382	4,762	8,144	3,424	5,239	8,663	2,866	4,591	7,457	2,742	4,416	7,158
40-44	3,706	5,135	8,841	4,344	6,370	10,714	3,526	5,523	9,049	3,084	4,976	8,060
45-49	3,972	5,450	9,422	4,762	6,868	11,630	4,300	6,521	10,821	3,563	5,590	9,153
50-54	4,370	6,018	10,388	5,105	7,291	12,396	4,835	7,191	12,026	4,141	6,333	10,474
55-59	4,154	5,790	9,944	5,617	8,048	13,665	5,247	7,743	12,990	4,601	6,945	11,546
60-64	3,276	4,586	7,862	5,336	7,745	13,081	5,526	8,170	13,696	4,932	7,423	12,355
65-69	2,263	3,380	5,643	4,209	6,135	10,344	5,220	7,792	13,012	5,030	7,610	12,640
70-74	1,549	2,740	4,289	2,902	4,521	7,423	4,236	6,447	10,683	4,646	7,129	11,775
75+	1,237	2,535	3,772	2,176	3,476	5,652	3,149	4,855	8,004	4,612	7,161	11,773
TOTAL	39.661	55,481	95,142	52,385	73,280	125,665	54,067	75,634	129,701	54,597	76,375	130,972

Figure. 2 - International migrant stock at mid-year by sex and by age for Republic of North Macedonia, 1990-2017 (UN,2018)

Given that the number of residents in the Republic of North Macedonia ranged between 1,996,228 in 1990 and 2,083,000in 2017, we can see that the percentage of migrants rose from 4.8% in 1990 to 6.3 % in 2017.

Year	Albania	Turkey	Serbia	Montenegro
1990	45,001	11,417	17,950	4,365
2000	69,367	18,717	15,656	7,614
2010	70,230	19,770	16,538	8,043
2017	67,924	19,958	17,963	8,729

Figure 3.: Represents the country of origin of the people living in the Republic of North Macedonia. There is also an insignificant number of people originating from Egypt, Croatia and Bulgaria (UN, 2018).

*There is also an insignificant number of people originating from Egypt, Croatia and Bulgaria.

The economic situation in the country in this period can be best depicted by the poverty index of the State Statistics Bureau based on the data of the survey on incomes and living condition conducted in compliance with the EU recommendations. The latest poverty index of the State Statistics Bureau is the one made according to the Laeken Indicators back in 2017. The basis for the estimates of the poverty rate is income, while the poverty threshold is set at 60% of the median income.

According to the 2017 data, the poverty rate in the Republic of North Macedonia was 22.2 %. In terms of the types of households, the 2017 poverty rate in a household comprising two adults and two underage children was 20.0%. According to the most common economic activity status, the poverty rate among those employed was 9.0%, while the poverty rate among poor pensioners was 7.7% according to the Gini coefficient (measure for unequal income distribution).

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United Kingdom

A ‘people centred’ approach to understanding Migrationary patterns form the Commonwealth to the UK in the 1950’s

Introduction

This paper is written in collaboration between Pam Schweitzer from the European Reminiscence Network and David Hockham from the University of Greenwich. It brings together statistical evidence from trusted sources and interviews from the Reminiscence Theatre Archive, providing a people centred account of migration after the war from specific Commonwealth countries. It is by no means exhaustive, however, it is hoped that when read in tandem with reports from our EU colleagues, that comparison can be made between the workings of the Commonwealth as an association of counties, and that of the European Union. This may offer specific incite in terms of migration between associations of countries.

Defining the terms “migration” and “migration background”

The Term Migrant and migration background is difficult to define in the UK. It is used differently in different data sets, data sources and in the law. The Migration Observatory, based at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford is considered a trusted and impartial source who note that ‘the use of the term ‘migrant’ in public debate is extremely loose and often conflates issues of immigration, race/ethnicity, and asylum’. A migrant background might mean that an individual is born overseas, a foreign national or someone who has moved to the UK for a year or more. Often, captured in the statistics are Higher Education students who are in the UK to study for three years, skewing data.

The definition of ‘migrant’ is not simply a technical problem but has an important effect on migration data and analysis generated from such data. This in turn has an impact on public understanding and on policy debates. The confusion in public debate over the definition of ‘migrant’ poses challenges for UK government policy. (From the Migration Observatory, University of Oxford)

The Office of National Statistics, the UK’s largest independent producer of official statistics and the recognised national statistical institute in the UK defines “international” migration through two lenses. Migration Flow, which captures the amount of people moving in and out of the country across a period of time and Migration Stock, “The number of non-UK born or non-British citizens resident in the UK at a given point in time” (ONS: 2019a). Figure 1 is a graph of migration flow over the past ten and demonstrates that migration has continued to add to the UK population in this period.



Figure 1.: Graph of migration flow demonstrates that migration has continued to add to the UK population in this certain period. Source: Office for National Statistics – Long-term International Migration.

According to the ONS Data sets, the UK Population in June 2018 (ONS, 2019b) was 65,398 million, of which 9,388 million people (14,3%) might be described as non-UK Born. Interestingly only 3,656 million people have migrated from the EU representing less than 40% of all Migrants living in the UK. This statistic highlighted here as immigration was one of the campaign areas that "Leave EU" pushed to successfully win the BREXIT vote (June, 2016).



Figure 2.: Graph of migration flow demonstrates that migration has continued to add to the UK population in this certain period. Source: Office for National Statistics – Long-term International Migration 2016

Historic Migration – Post War Britain and the Windrush Generation

For the purposes of this report we have chosen to look at the 'Windrush generation', named after the ship, 'HMT Empire Windrush' which brought the first generation of immigrants from British Commonwealth countries, in the West Indies, to live and work in Britain between 1948 and 1960. Based on census data, this decade demonstrates a significant shift in migration patterns from British Commonwealth countries. In 1951, census data shows the West Indian population in the UK at 17,218. By 1961, this had increased to 173,659 (Peach: 1991) and by 1966, to 330,788. Whilst this represents a small percentage of the then UK Population (0,3% and 0,6% respectively), the change in the amount of non-white people in the UK was noticeable to UK born British citizens creating a rise in xenophobia and racism. This will be explored in the next section through accounts taken from Afro-Caribbean Elders.

This rise in xenophobia and racism is similar to the lived experience of those from different ethnic backgrounds in Britain today, with BREXIT being now a driver to allow nationalist thinking to be aired on public platforms. This has been significantly noticeable from the 2016 vote where a hostile home office immigration policy requires proof of nationality to gain access to

services; making landlords, doctors and Human Resource Departments metaphorical border guards. This hostile immigration environment caused the recent Windrush scandal, where those who, in the postwar era of the 1950's and 1960's who were invited to the UK as British Commonwealth citizens to help rebuild Britain, had their nationality questioned. With records destroyed by the home office and no passport of papers to prove they, or their children are British with circa 1,000 people wrongfully deported back to the Caribbean (Guardian, 2018).

In the 1950's, people from the West Indies were being actively recruited to help rebuild Britain after the massive destruction wrought by World War II, especially in the big cities. However, this did not ensure those coming to Britain a smooth ride. The race riots from 1948 through the 1950's were encouraged by right-wing pro-white groups, building on ill-feeling at competition for housing and jobs.

Riots started in Liverpool in August 1948, and spread in the 1950s to Birmingham, Nottingham and west London. They culminate in the infamous Notting Hill riots in August 1958. The separate assaults of five black men by white youths in Shepherd's Bush and Notting Hill sparks unrest and at around midnight on 30 August rioting breaks out and lasts a week (BBC, 2020).

It is the same ill feeling towards competition which permeates today's populist discussions, a mentality that "more people, means there is not enough for those born here," with hyperbolic boundaries drawn across lines of nationality. Whilst in 2012, immigration into the UK from EU countries overtook those of other countries, since the BREXIT vote we are experiencing the beginning of a flow in the opposite direction, as EU citizens who have come to work in the Nation Health Service and the Care sector decide to leave because they are uncertain of their future in the UK. The Brexit result has been hugely unsettling, and Britain has become a less desirable place to build a new life for their families. Now that we find ourselves short of labour again in these sectors and also in agriculture, we begin to imagine a time when we shall be recruiting workers again from across the world, just as we did in the post-war years.

Post War Labour Shortages and the need for Immigration 1948-1960

Post-World War II Britain had a major labour shortage. British Commonwealth citizens were actively encouraged to come to work in Britain, fuelled by a sense of patriotism and for some, an opportunity to re-join the armed forces having fought for the country as part of the war. Importantly, the legal framework of "The British Nationalities Act" gave Commonwealth citizens legal and free entry into Britain.

Those arriving often took up work in public services, especially the new National Health Service, in public transport and in heavy industry. Accounts of the types or work and incentives are outlined in the extract below describing specific initiatives and incentives set up by the Barbadian government:

> *"The Barbadian government set up a sponsorship scheme in 1955 under which British Transport Commission, the London Transport Executive, the British Hotels and Restaurants Association, and the Regional Hospital Boards received workers. London Transport Executive sent a direct recruiting team to Barbados in 1956 (Glass, 1960, 68) and by 1958 it had recruited almost 1,000 workers. By the end of 1961 it had recruited over 2,000 Barbadians (Patterson, 1963, 96). Between 1955 and 1960, the Barbadian government scheme had*

sponsored 3,680 workers of whom 40 per cent went to the London Transport Executive. The main conclusion to draw from this is that directly recruited or sponsored labour was an important but minority element in the migratory flow affecting people only from Barbados. In Jamaica, the government tried, if anything, to restrict the flow (Davison 1962, 30). It is also important to note that direct recruitment came into play after the migratory streams had been established.

The movement to Britain acted as a 'replacement population', moving to gaps left by the upward mobility of the white population. Migration sustained significant parts of the service industries in Britain, in hospitals and transport and industrially it was concentrated in some of the least dynamic industries (Peach, 1967). Since the radical analysts of migration stress the dependence of the capitalist system on the inputs of raw labour, it is worth noting that it was the flagging social services and the weaker parts of the industrial economy which used migration as a prop." (Peach, 1991, p. 8)

Financial Impact of Migration

Comparisons can be made between the 1950's and today, where those who have migrated to the UK still prop up public service sectors. It is important to note that people who migrate for work tend to be younger and healthier. For this reason, the UK Office of Budget Responsibility note that "a higher share of incoming migrants will continue to be working age than the population in general and that they will earn the same as people in the existing population of the same age and gender" (Migration Observatory, 2019). As such, on the whole, migrants will pay both tax and national Insurance requiring little in the way of public services or benefits.

The familiar pattern of the 1950's saw men migrate and to find work, before sending for their wives and families.

"I was 39 when I came here. I was here and my wife was at home. After the first six months, I thought I can't leave that woman by herself. If I would be unfaithful, it would be very bad. Quickest remedy you can – to stop that – I decided I must send for my wife. She came and after three months I send for my son. The ship brought him over without paying a fee" (Schweitzer, P, 1984: p. 34).

An Oxford Economics Report notes that, whilst in the short term, there are additional costs incurred by the state to educate young children, over the lifetime of their lifetime, there is a net financial gain (Oxford Economics, 2019). This is as true today as it was in the 1950's.

Understanding the Social Impact of Migration

Those arriving from the Commonwealth did not always receive the warm welcome they had expected, and many were disillusioned by the reality of a grey, austerity, 1950's Britain; so different from their dreams and hopes.

"After the war, we were invited into this country by the Government. Enoch Powell was one of them that sanctioned for the West Indians to come to help clean up this country after the war. I expected a decent job and to be treated as an equal. That's what I believed. But when I came here it was a different thing altogether" (Schweitzer, P, 1984, p. 31).

Finding a place to rent was often difficult and upsetting for the new arrivals. They reported signs in windows saying, "No blacks, children or dogs taken". Others were invited to view rooms for rent but were turned away as soon as they arrived, and landlords saw that they were black. They had to put up with very poor living conditions.

> *"I came here in 1961. The picture I had of England in my mind's eye when I left my home in Georgetown in Guyana. I said to myself, is this the place they call England? I was so disappointed. Finding somewhere to live was very hard. When you see little mice running all over the little room. Back home, everybody got their own house, so when I heard about a flat, I thought it would have so many rooms. But I found that a husband and wife and children were living in one room. I was disappointed. I had that experience of living in a one-room flat and it was like a box, eight foot by six foot. I had to do everything in that room. I fell off the bed more times than I care to remember. I remember I cooked a meal there and I put the meal on the table and the whole table collapsed. I cried" (IBID).*

Many people came to stay for just four or five years but found themselves unable to afford to return. Others formed new relationships and started having families, so they too decided to remain in the UK.

> *"We all came for four or five years, but the time went on so fast, we just didn't think, until we end up doing twenty-five, thirty ears instead of five. Now we're here to stay. Where people had sold out their little holdings, they didn't have anywhere to go back to" (IBID, p. 3).*

Many young women from the Caribbean came over on their own to gain access to training, especially in health-related fields, where they often had accommodation provided. They found they had to overcome racial prejudice and rejection by the host community. Some of this was attributable to the fact that British people were very unfamiliar with black people and were afraid of them.

> *"I remember when I went to Mile End Hospital, a little old woman looked at my hand and she couldn't understand. She said, 'How is it that the middle of your hand is white, and your skin is black?' She feels my hair and I just sit there and let her do that, and I said to myself, 'Poor thing'" (IBID, p. 31).*

Understanding the Political Implications of Migration in the 1950's

Migration has an impact on policy making. As a result of the racism encountered by those who migrated to the UK, the Race Relations Act (1965) came into force. This meant that it was illegal for racial discrimination to occur in public places, protecting people from prejudice based on 'colour, race or ethnic or national origins'. This did not out-law racism in private boarding houses or shops and as such, open racism continued in day-to-day Britain.

The 1965 legislation is the beginning of UK policy making which aims to reduce inequality based on race. Its modern equivalent is the UK's Equalities Act (2010) where race is one of multiple protected characteristics. Whilst discrimination on racial, or ethnic grounds illegal,

there is still tension today between people's right to expression (Human Rights Act 1998), and UK Hate Speech laws, which make it illegal to express hatred towards an individual, or intends to (or likely will) stir up racial hatred (Public Order Act 1986).

Using verbatim testimony from older people from the West Indies

We have used verbatim testimony from West Indian Elders who came to the UK in the time period discussed in this report (1948-1960). These interviews are transcribed and printed in "A Place To Stay" published by Age Exchange in 1984. It forms part of the archival material of the Reminiscence Theatre Archive which has a large number of ethnic minority elders' memories recorded, from the 1980s, by Pam Schweitzer. It is now preserved and digitised for posterity allowing others to access hundreds of personal stories (RTA, 2019). Students from the University of Greenwich have accessed these memories and used them as an inspiration for their own work in the field of Reminiscence Theatre, a method of theatre making created by Pam Schweitzer and now taught across the world. Our hope is that, by hearing the words of real people has made the statistics taken from statutory bodies more meaningful and routes our discussion in the lives of those who came to the UK to support Britain at a time of need.

The experience of the people recorded in the Archive is of particular interest now, as Caribbean elders are being subject to investigation as to their right to remain in the UK. Some came over as small children and have lived all their lives in Britain. They never considered that their status as British citizens would be open to question, much less that they are under threat of deportation back to a country they have not seen since they were four or five years old. This development has been hugely controversial and has appalled most British people. Every effort is being made to resist such deportations.

This form of harassment in Britain today is part of an intentionally hostile environment created with a view to lowering immigration numbers in the face of opposition to their presence on the part of many voters. This hostile environment and the entire gruelling process of BREXIT has failed to satisfy the current populist RISE OF NATIONALISM. Post-Brexit there has been a rise in racial attacks in social media and a negative portrayal in the press, which has alarmed many British people. In London and the big cities in particular, cultural integration has gone much further and people welcome living in a multicultural and multi-ethnic community.

There has been much academic interest in the Windrush Scandal. This report offers a cursory glance of the decade after World War II and aims to demonstrate the need for migration today, as in 1950. Our Colleagues in the Applied Sociology Research Group will be hosting a conference on the issue later this year (2019).

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Conclusion

Movements of people are an inherent phenomenon to human beings. It happened before, it happens nowadays, and it will still happen, especially in the globalised world we are currently living in. Regardless of the legal status and the significant distinction between migrants on the one hand and refugees on the other, it is necessary to understand that societies must be able to adapt themselves to multiculturality and diversity and thus get the best out of them.

In particular, the realities of the countries participating in the Open European Societies project with regard to migration that have been presented in this study, are rather different due to historical, economic and socio-political reasons, among many others. Some of the countries that are mentioned in this study are mainly sending countries such as the Czech Republic, North Macedonia and Hungary and others are mainly migrant-hosting countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and France. In the case of North Macedonia, for instance, we are talking about a transit country, and many of them have a combination of certain features of these categories. Hence, the main migratory phenomenon differs from country to country.

If we take into account the percentage of migrant population of the countries that the study refers to, as well as when they became receiving countries, there are two main categories:

a) countries with a high percentage of immigrant population and a more or less long period of time being a receiving country, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Denmark;

b) countries with a low rate of immigrant population, both in the past and in the present, being these North Macedonia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Greece is a different case, since it was a sending country (and it still is) but at the same time has been hosting immigrants since the 80s (a small number though) and especially since the 90s facing in parallel the challenging consequences of the irregular migration.

The countries that belong to the first category share certain features. For instance, all of them became receiving countries decades ago, shortly after WWII or the following decades. Although Greece also has a large number of foreign population it did not become a receiving country until the 90s. Thus, whereas this is a relatively new phenomenon in Greece, these four other countries have been having this sort of experience for a few decades longer, which has an impact on social integration and integration policy.

Another common feature of the countries that belong to the first category, as well as Greece, is that immigrants played a really important role in the labour market of each of the countries. In fact, some countries had a major need of workforce in order for their economies to remain competitive. This was the case of West Germany, for instance.

France, United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark also have a considerably larger number of populations with migration background, which makes these societies more diverse. The implemented integration policies of these countries were and still are different. For example, the United Kingdom implemented a multiculturalist integration policy; the main goal of the integration policy in France was assimilation; Germany, on the other hand, did not have an actual integration policy until the beginning of the 21st century (note the meaning of Gastarbeiter). Therefore, there are different forms of diversity due to the different countries

of origin of foreign people, different integration policies, etc. What is more, one of the most interesting consequences of these migration movements, is the exposure to multiculturality, which among other variables, creates more open and welcoming societies.

The situation is rather different in the countries that fall into the second category (Czech Republic, North Macedonia and Hungary):

- First of all, they have not got large numbers of foreign population and they have never been receiving countries, at least in their recent history.
- The case of the Czech Republic is different when compared to Hungary and North Macedonia: the economy is powerful, and the labor market shows positive indicators. However, Czechia is not perceived as a potential destination. The exposure of Czech society to multiculturality is rather limited and the impact of past migration movements is limited to demographics. Furthermore, Czech people do not have the motivation to leave the country due to its good economy.
- Hungary and North Macedonia are slightly different. There is a small number of foreign inhabitants and, historically, they did not experience large movements of people moving into the country. They are not considered potential destinations. Therefore, the problem for these countries is emigration, since it has a negative impact on demographics and economic development. Here lies the difference with the Czech Republic. People tend to leave Hungary and North Macedonia seeking better opportunities. As stated above, this phenomenon has a negative impact at different levels, such as the economy, the labor market and demographics. One of the main problems is the decreasing of the proportion of the working age population. It is important to note that the three of these countries were for more than four decades under socialist regimes in which the movement of people was strictly regulated by law. Each of these countries has an entirely different history, economy, social context, culture, etc.

There are many variables to be taken into account and migration and its social, economic and political impact are extremely complex phenomena. However, if we consider the information that is provided in this study, we can extract some general conclusions.

Firstly, migration has many positive sides and some countries have benefited from it. The impact of migration goes far beyond the economy, the labor market and covering the need of workforce: it also has an impact on the demographics, politics, the economy and the society itself.

Secondly, a global approach towards the impact of migratory movements is not possible, since every country has different socio-economic, political and cultural contexts, especially when it comes to the degree of acceptance of multiculturality and diversity; it is not possible to compare the experience of a country like the United Kingdom, which became a receiving country shortly after WWII, with Hungary, a country that did not experience this phenomenon in its recent history.

Finally, we have to consider that migration movements affect countries in a different way depending on the condition that some of them are losing population, and some of them are receiving newcomers. People should be able to move to other countries and receive integration support there. However, it is also important to promote stability and good living conditions in the countries where the situation pushes people to leave their homes seeking for safety, better opportunities or for mere survival.

History of Migration in the 20th century and its Impact in Europe

Case studies: Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, North Macedonia & United Kingdom

Within the framework of the European Project
OPEN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

Strand 2: Democratic engagement and civic participation
Strand 2.2: Networks of Towns
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Researchers:

Jugend- & Kulturprojekt e.V. (Germany) - **Álvaro Sanz Lampérez** / Aarhus University (Denmark) - **Matthias Stephan** / AddArt NGO (Greece) - **Christina Dimitriadou** / Center for Intercultural Dialogue, CID (North Macedonia) - **Gabrijela Boshkov** / European Reminiscence Network (United Kingdom) - **Pam Schweitzer and David Hockham** Institute for Regional Development (Czech Republic) - **Cristiana Sartore** / La Transplanisphère (France) - **Noémie Besace** Pro Progressione (Hungary) - **Zsombor Lakatos**

Editors:

Jugend- & Kulturprojekt e.V. (Germany) - **Myrto-Helena Pertsinidi, Álvaro Sanz Lampérez & Konstantinos Tagkoulis**

Layout:

Jugend- & Kulturprojekt e.V. (Germany) - **Olga Yocheva**

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